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Economic theories provide conflicting hypotheses on how wealth inequality affects 
entrepreneurial dynamism. To empirically investigate its impact, we construct local measures 
of household wealth inequality based on financial rents, home equity, and 1880 farmland. We 
identify its effects on entrepreneurship by instrumenting it with land distribution under the 1862 
Homestead Act. Wealth inequality decreases firm entry and exit, and the proportion of high-
tech businesses across metropolitan statistical areas. There is also less redistribution into public 
goods supportive of entrepreneurship such as schooling and the judiciary. Income per capita 
consequently grows more slowly. (92 words) 
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I. Introduction 
Households’ wealth inequality is a defining societal characteristic with important implications 
for financial and real activity.1 The growth of wealth inequality during recent decades has 
returned the issue to the top of the agendas of policymakers and social leaders, but despite such 
renewed attention, economists are still far from reaching a consensus on its implications. In this 
paper, we study the relationship between household wealth inequality and the main drivers of 
economic activity: entrepreneurship, corporate financing, and growth in income per capita. 
Starting with Schumpeter, entrepreneurship has been considered an important component of 
economic growth (Schumpeter (1934); Aghion and Howitt (1992); Akcigit and Kerr (2018)), 
and it is therefore no surprise that the study of its determinants has gained attention in the 
academic literature (e.g., Dunne, Roberts and Samuelson (1988); Glaeser and Kerr (2009); Kerr 
and Nanda (2010)). 
A perspective that dates back at least to Adam Smith conjectures a negative relationship 
between inequality and entrepreneurship.2 Wealth inequality may prevent the development of 
institutions supportive of entrepreneurship and new businesses, such as schools and the 
judiciary, thus impairing economic growth. The wealthy may consider the financing of these 
public goods as a form of redistribution and refuse to fund them or they may distort their 
functioning to suit their interests.3 Another view, rooted in the works of Malthus and Kaldor 
(1961), predicts a positive relationship between wealth inequality and economic development 
                                                 
1 Recent academic work consequently defines, measures, analyzes, and explains inequality (e.g., Piketty (2014)). 
2 In The Wealth of Nations, Adam Smith expressed concern that an unequal distribution of land may have had a 
negative impact on the development of the New World colonies. In his words: “The engrossing of land, in effect, 
destroys this plenty and cheapness” (Smith (1776), p. 726). 
3 Engerman and Sokoloff (1997), Glaeser, Scheinkman and Shleifer (2003), Sonin (2003), Berkowitz and Clay 
(2011), Rajan and Ramcharan (2011), Acemoglu and Robinson (2013) pp. 152‒158, and Kumhof, Rancière and 
Winant (2015). 







as wealthy individuals may generate both high aggregate demand and high savings, which can 
ultimately support entrepreneurship.4 
The related empirical evidence is mixed. A group of papers show a negative relationship 
between inequality and economic development (Alesina and Rodrik (1994); Persson and 
Tabellini (1994); Easterly (2007)), whereas other works find a positive or a nonlinear 
relationship (Barro (2000); Forbes (2000); Banerjee and Duflo (2003); Braun, Parro and 
Valenzuela (2019)). All these studies, however, focus on cross-sections of countries, and they 
often employ income inequality as a proxy for wealth inequality. 
Our study brings these alternative perspectives to the data and focuses on a novel setting 
based on households’ wealth inequality measured at the US metropolitan statistical area (MSA) 
level.5 Studying metropolitan statistical areas allows us to compare locations that are similar in 
terms of quality of the labor force and demography, thus reducing concerns that omitted 
variables may be driving our results. At the same time, MSAs provide us with a sizable 
proportion of new business formation, as 80 percent of new firms are located in MSAs (see 
Robb and Robinson (2014)). 
Our contributions are threefold. We first provide different measures of local wealth 
inequality that identify the fundamental elements of wealth: households’ financial rents and 
housing equity. Despite originating from different sources, these measures are highly correlated 
and they robustly document the pattern of regional wealth inequality within the United States. 
                                                 
4 “There must therefore be a considerable class of persons who have both the will and power to consume more 
material wealth than they produce, or the mercantile classes could not continue profitably to produce so much 
more than they consume. In this class the landlords no doubt stand pre-eminent” (Malthus (1836), p. 466)”. The 
notion that wealthy individuals may help economic growth via their higher saving rates was formalized by Stiglitz 
(1969) and Bourguignon (1981). 
5 Our investigation at this level of geographical disaggregation is appropriate because US local administrations are 
often co-responsible (with state-level authorities) for many important elements of public life, such as the 
organization of schooling, the judiciary and enforcement of the law, and taxation. 







We then exploit the US institutional setting to design an identification strategy that allows us 
to connect wealth inequality to new business formation, corporate financing, and the local 
degree of economic development, thus minimizing endogeneity concerns. Last, we explore the 
mechanisms that connect wealth inequality to business formation, focusing in particular on a 
channel based on political preferences for redistribution and the provision of public goods. 
Our first measure of local wealth inequality is based on total dividends earned by US 
households in 2004 (the first year this data is available). Assuming that every household invests 
in the market index, financial wealth is directly proportional to the total in dividends they 
receive. Since the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) provides data on dividends earned in every 
zip code, we are able to back out the distribution of financial wealth in each MSA. Our second 
measure relies on households’ housing equity data, available from the US Census Bureau and 
the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac). The US census provides data, at 
the MSA level, on the value of housing units that are free of mortgages (i.e., the value of the 
house corresponds to the household’s housing equity), whereas Freddie Mac provides data on 
all mortgages (and underlying house values) it has acquired between 1999 and 2004. 
We use this information to construct the distribution of financial rents and housing equity at 
the local level and to compute Gini coefficients of financial and housing wealth inequality.6 In 
Figure 1 we observe that, despite being originated from different sources, both Ginis produce a 
very similar map of wealth inequality. Inland California and the South appear to be among the 
most unequal areas along both inequality measures, whereas the Midwest, and especially 
Minnesota and Wisconsin, are the least unequal. Figure 2 provides us with a preview of our 
                                                 
6 Mian, Rao and Sufi (2013) likewise construct local measures of US households’ net worth, while Saez and 
Zucman (2016) measure US-wide wealth inequality over a longer time period. Additionally, we compute 
inequality measures based on the wealth holdings of the top 10 percent wealth owners. 







main result—that is, a negative relationship between wealth inequality (on the x-axis) and 
business formation from 2004 to 2012 (on the y-axis) across MSAs. Hence, more disparity in 
wealth is associated with less entrepreneurial activity.7 
Establishing a causal relationship between wealth inequality and entrepreneurial activities, 
however, is difficult, as wealth inequality itself may correlate with unobserved factors that are 
likely to affect our estimates. We alleviate this concern with an empirical strategy that relies on 
two ingredients. First, as our measures of wealth inequality are local (and because we know the 
location of new “establishments”—defined here as firms that are created), we can saturate our 
specifications with state, year, and/or state-year fixed effects to account for any unobserved 
heterogeneity at those aforementioned levels. This procedure allows us to control for competing 
explanations of the deeply rooted determinants of institutions, such as individual states’ type of 
colonization and legal traditions (see Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) and Berkowitz 
and Clay (2011), pp. 16‒59), as well as changes in their legislation and regulation. Importantly, 
while our focus is wealth inequality, the detail of our data always allows us to control for the 
average level of wealth as well as of income in each MSA. 
Second, we instrument the contemporary measure of wealth inequality with the proportion 
of land assigned in each MSA via the 1862 Homestead Act and exploit the Act`s distribution 
of equal plots of land to early settlers in the nineteenth century. Indeed, the Homestead Act 
entitled any person who was head of a family or 21 years of age to apply for a plot of 160 acres. 
The only requirement was that the homesteader should either live on the land or cultivate it for 
the next five years. 
                                                 
7 In Figure 2 Panel B, we obtain a very similar result if we winsorize the employed housing wealth inequality 
measure at the 1 percent level. 







We exploit the quasi-exogenous variation coming from early settlers’ demand for land 
during the ten years following first settlement, when the quality of the land was still unknown 
and the settlers reached the western frontier for the first time, having little or no reliable 
information on the climate and the geography of the area. This allows us to consider the 
distribution of land in this period to be quasi-random—an assumption that we then verify in the 
data. The federal government intended to distribute public land via homesteading quickly, but 
this made the process chaotic: early settlers, since they had to compete with wealthy speculators 
to obtain land first, filed applications for plots in areas whose features were still unknown. At 
the same time, homesteading, by assigning equal plots of land to households, may have biased 
the distribution of wealth toward equality from the very beginning, in most cases before 
communities were formed and before local institutions such as schools and the judiciary even 
existed. As a result, the Homestead Act, as the first element to influence inequality, allows us 
to capture the effects of initial inequality as opposed to inequality created later by the local 
institutions themselves. 
A natural concern with our instrument is whether homesteaders possessed different human 
capital than an average settler or whether the land assigned via the Homestead Act was 
intrinsically different from an average lot of farmland. In either case, we would have 
homesteading directly affecting entrepreneurship, hence violating the exclusion restriction. We 
will address these and other issues with a series of tests intended to corroborate the validity of 
the identification strategy. The estimated coefficients robustly suggest that MSA-level 
inequality decreases firm entry into and exit from the MSA, indicating that wealth inequality 
has a negative effect on local business formation. Our estimates are not only statistically 
significant but also economically relevant. A standard deviation increase in MSA-level wealth 







inequality leads to an approximate 12 percent decline in new establishments’ entry and exit per 
capita. We also find that new establishments created in more unequal areas are more likely to 
be units generated by already existing firms than new ventures genuinely formed ex novo, and 
that establishments in unequal MSAs are more likely to be engaged in traditional rather than 
high-tech sectors. More unequal MSAs also have lower growth in income per capita. 
Last, we strengthen the causal interpretation of our results by studying what mechanism can 
explain them. We find that wealth inequality comes with less provision of public goods 
considered important for business formation and economic growth. In particular, more unequal 
MSAs are characterized by lower school expenditure per pupil, lower proportion of public 
school revenue obtained from local sources, and a more inefficient justice system. These 
findings can explain the negative effect of inequality on entrepreneurship we document: a lower 
supply of public goods may deter entrepreneurs from setting up a firm in the first place. We 
also find evidence suggesting that these policy outcomes are the result of stronger political 
preferences against redistribution. Using detailed data on political campaign contributions from 
Bonica (2014), we show that in more unequal MSAs larger campaign contributions flow to 
local and state election candidates with platforms proposing a lower supply of public goods. 
In sum, we provide a number of findings that consistently suggest that wealth inequality is 
an important determinant of entrepreneurship and of the type and amount of financing 
entrepreneurs receive.8 Our analysis also adds to a growing literature on finance and inequality. 
While most of the work in this area studies how finance may affect the degree of income or 
wealth inequality (see Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (2009) and Beck, Levine and Levkov (2010) 
                                                 
8 See Black and Strahan (2002), Berkowitz and White (2004), Perotti and von Thadden (2006), and a review by 
Carlino and Kerr (2015), among others. 







for a review), our paper studies how wealth inequality affects financial outcomes (and, in this 
sense, is more similar to Rajan (2009), Bagchi and Svejnar (2015), and Degryse, Lambert and 
Schwienbacher (2018)). 
We also contribute to the literature that studies the long-run dynamics of business formation 
in the United States (Decker, Haltiwanger, Jarmin and Miranda (2018) and Foster, Grim, 
Haltiwanger and Wolf (2018)) and we relate them to wealth inequality. Using simple time series 
data, Figure 3 shows that while there has been a decline in US business formation starting in 
the 1970s, wealth inequality has increased: a pattern broadly consistent with our findings. 
II. Inequality and Entrepreneurial Outcomes 
A. Background 
1. Negative Relationship between Wealth Inequality and Business Formation 
A first group of theories predicts a negative relationship between wealth inequality and 
economic outcomes. These explanations do not imply a direct effect of inequality on 
entrepreneurship, but they rely on mediating factors in the form of public goods, income or 
capital taxation, and credit markets. We discuss and classify them below. 
Negative Redistribution Channels: these channels work through the notion that inequality 
may affect redistributive policies and the provision of public goods, which in turn may 
adversely affect entrepreneurial dynamism.9 For instance Engerman and Sokoloff (2002), 
Galor, Moav and Vollrath (2009), and Acemoglu and Robinson (2013) state that inequality may 
decrease the amount of redistribution in a society. As a result, unequal societies will be 
                                                 
9 For the sake of simplicity, we also define education as a public good even if it can also be considered a private 
good that can be provided by the public sector. 







characterized by a lower level of provision of local public goods as their financing is seen by 
the wealthy as an unwarranted form of redistribution to the poor. For example, when various 
states introduced some form of redistribution of school financing during the 1980s (Card and 
Payne (2002)), wealthy neighborhoods lobbied to pay a lower contribution to the schooling 
service because they did not want to redirect resources to poor districts (Stark  and Zasloff 
(2003)).10 The wealthy may also use their influence to distort the development of local public 
goods in order to promote their own interests. For instance, the fact that state judges are elected 
may enable wealthy individuals to twist judicial decisions in their favor by contributing to 
judges’ electoral campaigns. Supporting this possibility, a New York Times article published in 
2006 documents that Ohio Supreme Court judges ruled in favor of those who had contributed 
to their campaigns 70 percent of the time (Liptak and Roberts (2006); also Berkowitz and Clay 
(2011), p. 133). 
Positive Redistribution Channel: another set of explanations, put forward by Alesina and 
Rodrik (1994) and Persson and Tabellini (1994), states that inequality may be detrimental for 
economic growth because it increases the amount of redistribution, and hence future taxation 
on income and/or capital. As entrepreneurs will see a larger share of their gains taken away by 
the tax authorities, they will be less willing to invest or start a business altogether. 
Credit Market Channels: credit market channels have also been studied in this context, i.e., 
in more unequal areas, the quality of the banking and credit market could be especially poor. 
Rajan and Ramcharan (2011) for example provide evidence that in the 1930s, the wealthy may 
                                                 
10 Consistent with the idea that inequality could be detrimental to educational outcomes, Goldin and Katz (1998) 
and Galor, Moav and Vollrath (2009) show that both high school graduation rates and expenditures on public 
education in the twentieth century were lower in states that displayed higher degrees of wealth inequality. 







have contributed to keeping banking markets underdeveloped in the US counties so as to 
maintain their grip on power. 11 
2. A Positive Relationship between Wealth Inequality and Business Formation 
An alternative view to those just presented considers wealth inequality as a positive factor for 
the economy. With their deep pockets, wealthy individuals may help stabilize aggregate 
demand and reduce the average cost of production of new, high-tech goods, making them more 
accessible to the middle class (Matsuyama (2002)). The existence of inequality in income and 
wealth may encourage individuals to work harder; rewarding employees with equal wages may 
discourage them from producing the desired level of effort (Mirrlees (1971)). Philanthropy and 
charity may produce enough resources to extend schooling and economic opportunities to the 
poor, enhancing human capital formation. In a 2001 article, Forbes Magazine, for example, 
espouses the view that, traditionally, charity in the United States “concentrated in education 
and acculturation” and “stressed the skills and attitudes of self-reliance and personal 
responsibility.” 
  
                                                 
11 Moreover, even if regions display the same degree of financial development as one another, wealth inequality 
could still have a direct negative effect on entrepreneurship as suggested by Banerjee and Newman (1993) and 
Aghion and Bolton (1997). In an economy with credit constraints, an individual’s likelihood of starting a business 
increases with his or her wealth. This implies that, for any level of wealth, more unequal areas will have lower 
business formation figures as fewer individuals (possibly only the very rich) will have enough wealth to overcome 
credit market imperfections. 







B. Empirical Strategy 
1. Main Specification 
In our main analysis, we will estimate the impact of wealth inequality on the number of 
establishments’ entries and exits to and from the market, using data at the MSA level.12 In 
particular, for entry and exit, we will estimate the following equation: 
 
 
where Yj,t indicates the natural logarithm for the number of establishments’ entries and exits in 
the metropolitan statistical area j at year t. In line with Kerr and Nanda (2010), we will focus 
on gross business entry and exit per capita. The variable Wealth Inequality indicates one of our 
measures of local wealth inequality. Controls stands for a set of MSA controls, such as total 
financial and housing wealth, population growth, the catholic-to-protestant ratio, and housing 
prices—all detailed in Appendix Tables A.I and A.II. These variables will allow us to control 
for time-varying MSA characteristics: for instance, the catholic-to-protestant ratio may proxy 
for differences in the degree of risk aversion in the MSAs (see Hilary and Hui (2009)). Finally, 
the level and growth of house prices allow us to control for the possibility that homeowners 
may borrow against the value of their homes in order to set up a new business. 
2. Measuring Wealth Inequality 
Obtaining representative measures of wealth inequality at the local level is challenging. We 
construct two proxies for local wealth inequality that embody the main avenues through which 
wealth can be accumulated—that is to say, financial capital and housing. The first one is based 
                                                 
12 In the analysis of the entry and exit of new firms, we use data at the MSA level, as data at the county level are 
not publicly available. 
, , , ,             (1) 







on current levels of financial wealth and is broadly based on a methodology introduced by Mian, 
Rao and Sufi (2013) and Saez and Zucman (2016); it intends to construct local-level measures 
of household net worth. The second measure is based on the available information on housing 
equity. 
The measure of financial wealth inequality looks at the totals in dividends and interest earned 
by US households in 2004, the first year in our sample period, as reported in Internal Revenue 
Service (IRS) Statistics of Income (SOI) data. The IRS/SOI data report the total dividend and 
interest income received by US households in a certain zip code. The information is reported 
as a total amount per zip code and is divided into five household income groups, ranging from 
low income to high income. Under the assumption that a typical household owns the market 
index for stocks and bonds, the amount of financial rents it receives depends only on the 
quantity of stocks and bonds it holds. We use this information to construct a Gini index of 
wealth inequality based on financial rents. The procedure we adopted to construct the index is 
detailed in Appendix Table A.III and section A of the Appendix.13 
The second measure of inequality relies on housing equity. From the Census Bureau we 
obtain data on the values of all houses that are fully owned by a household and do not have an 
outstanding mortgage. In providing this information, the census divides houses into bins 
corresponding to their different values in 2004. From Freddie Mac, we obtain information on 
housing equity for a more recent period of time. Freddie Mac has made available the details of 
                                                 
13 As an addition to the Gini index, we construct an alternative measure of wealth inequality: the proportion of 
households in the MSA/county that do not have financial wealth. The results we obtain with this alternative 
measure are the same as those obtained with the Gini index—if anything, stronger (i.e., with a lower p-value in 
terms of statistical significance and larger in terms of economic magnitude). 







a large selection of mortgages it purchased between 1999 and 2004.14 The data includes the 
MSA where the house was purchased, the value of the house at the time of the purchase, and 
the value of the mortgage originated. Note that between 1999 and 2004 Freddie Mac covered a 
large proportion of the mortgage market, about 27 percent. This information allows us to 
compute housing equity, divide households into the same housing value bins used in the census, 
and compute a Housing Wealth Gini index per MSA considering both housing equity between 
1999 and 2004 and the value of any house that is free of any mortgage (using the latter set we 
will also construct a No Mortgage Housing Wealth Gini). 
Both our inequality measures are imperfect proxies. The Financial Wealth Gini relies on the 
assumption that every individual owns the same (or very similar classes of) stocks (and, as a 
result, they obtain the same return).15 The Housing Wealth Gini lacks information on housing 
equities for houses purchased before 1999 with a mortgage still attached and relies on the 
information provided by Fannie Mae. Yet Figure 1 reveals that the maps of wealth inequality 
originating from our measures are remarkably similar. We observe that even within states there 
is quite some variation in the level of wealth inequality. MSAs with a higher level of wealth 
inequality tend to be concentrated in the South and to some extent in inland California. The 
Midwest appears to have a more equitable distribution of resources.16 
                                                 
14 The mortgages we consider in our data are provided by the Fannie Mae Loan Performance dataset, which 
includes over 35 million mortgage loans originated after January 1, 1999. The mortgages considered in the data 
are fixed rate, fully amortizing mortgage loans, with a maturity that is larger than 5 years but lower than 35 years. 
These mortgages were also supported by full borrower’s documentation. The data excludes riskier mortgages such 
as Alt-A, interest-only mortgages, and mortgages with a loan-to-value ratio greater than 97 percent. 
15 Piketty (2014), on pp. 439‒443, describes how wealthy investors tend to obtain higher returns on their 
investments. Using detailed data on Swedish households, Bach, Calvet and Sodini (2020) show that the top 10 
percent of wealth owners obtain returns on their investments that are 2.5 percentage points higher than a median 
household. These higher returns are driven by a larger exposure to various risk factors. 
16 Unfortunately, as we do not have household level data on wealth, we cannot compute a Gini index that 
simultaneously places the same household in different wealth categories. For instance, a household may have high 
housing equity but low financial wealth. 







The average Gini coefficients we obtain are 0.87 for financial wealth inequality and 0.77 in 
the case of housing wealth inequality. These figures are also in line with measures of household 
wealth inequality obtained at the aggregated level. For example, Kuhn, Schularick and Steins 
(2019) provide US-wide figures of the Gini index that are remarkably similar to ours. In 2007, 
they find the US total wealth Gini index to be 0.82. A Gini index based only on financial wealth 
was 0.96; 0.67 when based only on housing wealth. To provide some comparison terms, the 
first decile of our MSA housing wealth distribution is about 0.67, and indicates a level of 
inequality comparable to France and the Netherlands in the year 2000 (see Davies, Lluberas 
and Shorrocks (2017)). The top decile of housing wealth inequality is about 0.82, a level similar 
to Brazil or Peru, as recorded in 2014, or to preindustrial societies in Europe (see Credit Suisse, 
Global Wealth Book, 2014; Scheidel (2017), p. 98 and p. 337).17 
Previous contributions to the literature have also considered land as another possible 
measure of wealth inequality (Alesina and Rodrik (1994); Galor, Moav and Vollrath (2009); 
Ramcharan (2010); Rajan and Ramcharan (2011); Vollrath (2013)). To construct such a 
historical measure, we obtain information on farmland plot sizes at the county level from the 
1880 US census. More precisely, for each county, we have information on the total number of 
farms that—based upon their total acreage of farmland—fall within a certain size bin. Farms 
are assigned to one of seven bins: under 10 acres, from 10 to 19 acres, 20 to 49 acres, 50 to 99 
acres, 100 to 499 acres, 500 to 999 acres, and 1,000 or more acres. The average 1880 Gini index 
                                                 
17 Using the same information, we constructed proxies of the total in dividends received by the top 10 percent of 
dividend earners and the housing wealth owned by the top 10 percent of house owners in value terms (see Appendix 
A for details on their construction). Since we do not have household level data on dividends and housing equity, 
we are forced to construct proxies of these measures relying on more aggregate data. 







is 0.44. It is significantly lower than the contemporary measures as it looks only at the 
distribution of land and does not consider individuals that are not landowners.18 
The housing and the financial wealth Ginis have a positive correlation of about 48 percent. 
We also find that 1880 land inequality displays a 37 and 26 percent positive correlation with 
the Financial Wealth Gini and Housing Gini, respectively.19 
3. Identification 
Wealth inequality could be correlated either with omitted factors or with the degree of 
entrepreneurship itself. The possibility of reverse causality is based on the idea that 
entrepreneurs are a small fraction of the population but hold a large share of the total wealth 
(Cagetti and De Nardi (2008)). When entrepreneurial activities are successful, most of the 
rewards are accrued among a limited number of individuals, which in turn increases wealth 
inequality. From this perspective, we may expect to find a positive correlation between wealth 
inequality and entrepreneurship. 
Wealth inequality could also be correlated with policies introduced by states, local income, 
and the racial composition of the geographical area. While we introduce variables that 
specifically control for these factors, we also address this problem in several additional ways. 
                                                 
18 The Financial Wealth Gini is on average higher than the other two Ginis because a relatively large proportion 
of households do not report any wealth held in equity, i.e., about 78 percent. The IRS reports changes with respect 
to the number and types of income bins after 2007; as a result it is difficult to compare Gini indexes throughout 
our time period. However, we find that the proportion of individuals not holding any financial wealth in 2012 is 
very similar to what we have in 2004—again, 78 percent. This also suggests that, at least in this dimension, the 
2008 financial crisis as well as the Great Recession did not have a large impact on the distribution of financial 
wealth. 
19 We present the correlations in Table A.IV in the Appendix. 







a) State Fixed Effects and Trends 
First, as we discussed above, our measure of wealth inequality is constructed at either the MSA 
or the county level, which allows us to control for state fixed effects and state trends in the 
analysis. These are a relevant feature of our identification strategy, as other main, deeply rooted 
determinants of institutions, such as legal and colonial origins, are defined at the state level. 
Berkowitz and Clay (2011) give a precise overview of which US states have civil law (rather 
than common law) traditions, and link their legal traditions to the countries of origin of early 
settlers. 
Importantly, a study of metropolitan statistical areas also enables us to better control for 
omitted variable bias as we compare locations that are similar in terms of quality of the labor 
force and demography. 
b) Instrumental Variable Analysis: The Homestead Act 
Second, we construct an instrumental variable analysis based on the distribution of land to early 
settlers via the 1862 Homestead Act.20 To encourage migration into the largely unexplored areas 
of the West, the federal government allocated free plots of land, all equal in size, to settlers. 
The Act of 1862 entitled any persons who were head of a family or 21 years of age to apply for 
a homestead. The only requirement was that the settler should either live on the land or cultivate 
                                                 
20 As an alternative set of instruments for wealth inequality we also employ weather and soil conditions because 
different climates and geographical environments may favor the production of one type of crop over another. 
Engerman and Sokoloff (1997) and Engerman and Sokoloff (2002) suggest that climates that are best suited to 
large plantations, such as sugar or tobacco plantations, will induce relatively high economic inequality. The 
production of these crops comes at a high fixed cost; as a result, in equilibrium, the market can support only a few 
farms. The outcome is thus a society controlled by few wealthy landowners. Conversely, climates supporting crops 
such as wheat will result in a more equal society. The production of these crops does not require high fixed costs; 
hence, the market can “bear” more producers. These societies will be more equal and be composed mainly of small 
landowners. 







it for the next five years (Gates (1969), pp. 393‒394).21 The idea is that the Homestead Act, by 
assigning equal-sized plots of land to early settlers, may have biased the local initial conditions 
toward a more equitable distribution of resources, before communities were even formed and 
any local institution, such as schools or the judiciary, were established.22 Most of the land 
assigned via Homestead was, in fact, beyond the 1860 frontier line as indicated in Figure 4 and 
was scarcely populated. As a result, the Homestead Act allows us to focus on the initial level 
of inequality that characterized a certain area, rather than subsequent inequality that could have 
been generated by local institutions themselves. We conjecture that areas with a larger 
proportion of land assigned via the Homestead Act should be more equal today.23 
Naturally, an instrument ought not to be correlated with other factors that may directly 
explain the pattern of contemporary entrepreneurship. For instance, the equal distribution of 
land may have a direct impact on business formation today by affecting subsequent land and 
farm values. To the extent that land can be used as collateral to receive a loan and start a new 
business, this would violate our exclusion restriction.24 To alleviate this problem we focus on 
the proportion of land assigned via the Homestead Act during its first ten years for MSAs 
                                                 
21 Settlers who decided not to meet the five year requirement could obtain full title to the land by paying a minimum 
price of one dollar twenty-five cents an acre. 
22 We consider land assigned via the original Homestead Act and subsequent acts such as the 1873 Timber Culture 
Act, the Desert Land Act, the 1877 Desert Land Act, the 1909 Enlarged Homestead Act, and the 1916 Stock-
Raising Homestead Act. Since the 1862 Homestead Act corresponds to about 91 percent of land distributed via 
homesteading, results do not change. 
23 The idea that by promoting equality the Homestead Act could have produced better local institutions was also 
recognized by the federal government in the nineteenth century. The 1884 report of the Public Land Commission 
described the Act in the following terms: “The Homestead Act is now the approved and preferred method of 
acquiring title to the public lands.[…] It protects the Government, it fills the States with homes, it builds up 
communities, and lessens the chances of social and civil disorder by giving ownership of the soil, in small tracts, 
to the occupants thereof. It was copied from no other nation’s system. It was originally and distinctively American, 
and remains a monument to its originators.” (Donaldson (1884), p. 350). 
24 Few recent papers have related real estate value to entrepreneurship: see Adelino, Schoar and Severino (2015), 
Corradin and Popov (2015), and Schmalz, Sraer and Thesmar (2017). Kerr, Kerr and Nanda (2015), however, 
provide evidence suggesting that land and home values may be not be a particularly important determinant in 
decisions with regard to becoming an entrepreneur. 







already settled in 1862, or during the first ten years following the first settlement of the MSA 
for MSAs whose first settlement occurred after 1862.25 
In the early years, land was assigned both via direct sales by the federal government and via 
homesteading. Both land speculators and early settlers struggled to understand what exactly 
were the best plots of land in a given area (Gates (1936)). Early settlers were confronted with a 
new and unknown environment and they lacked knowledge of the quality of the land and the 
type of weather that characterized the areas they moved into. As late as 1897, the National 
Weather Bureau admitted the primitive state of knowledge about rainfall and recognized that 
there were few observed patterns allowing for an accurate prediction of droughts (Hansen and 
Libecap (2002)). The settlers also lacked the knowledge required to interpret the consequences 
of weather and soil quality for agriculture. All these circumstances suggest that the proportion 
of land assigned via the Homestead Act may have had an important random component to it 
determined by settlers’ beliefs on the quality of soil and weather of the desired locations, which 
many times turned out to be faulty. 
It has also been observed that homesteading itself may have had an impact on the subsequent 
value of farming and the land (Hansen and Libecap (2004)). For instance, in the Great Planes, 
the small plots assigned via the Homestead Act were not adequate for the type of soil and 
weather that characterized the area. The large number of farm failures that followed the 1930s 
dust bowl phenomena has been attributed to the small size of farms in the Great Planes, a legacy 
of the Homestead movement. Larger plots would have been more appropriate and would have 
                                                 
25 We compute the proportion of land assigned via the Homestead Act as the total amount of land assigned via 
Homesteading divided by the total amount of land assigned in any form to any subject by the federal government. 
This measure has the advantage of capturing the strength of homesteading as a tool of land distribution vis-à-vis 
other available means. At the same time, it automatically excludes land that the federal government could not 
assign because it was uninhabitable or not suited to any economic activity. We rerun our analysis using 5, 15, or 
20 years for the homesteading assessment window. 







allowed farmers to make necessary investments to prevent drought and strong winds damaging 
their crops. We also run the analysis excluding areas that were affected by the 1930s dust bowl 
phenomena and the entire Great Planes area, as—if any—the effect of homesteading on farm 
values should be stronger in these areas. 
Another possible concern relates to the quality of the human capital of early settlers. It could 
be that homesteaders possessed different human capital than an average migrant (different 
entrepreneurial spirit, education, or cultural background). To the extent that such differences 
are persistent over years, homesteading could also affect the pattern of entrepreneurship via 
individuals’ skills. 
Our regressions will include a measure of the literacy of the local population as a proxy for 
human capital, as obtained from the US census of 1860. We also tackle this issue by studying 
a distribution policy where land was randomly allocated to the local community via a lottery 
system: the Georgia land lotteries of 1827‒35. Restricting our analysis to Georgia and focusing 
on the proportion of land distributed via lotteries allows us to abstract from concerns related to 
the quality of human capital, as land was given randomly and nearly the entire eligible 
population participated in the lottery (Bleakley and Ferrie (2016)).26 
III. Business Dynamics 
A. Data Sources 
We obtain data on establishments’ entry and exit from the Business Dynamics Statistics (BDS), 
a database set up by the US census that provides annual measures of, among other things, 
                                                 
26 As these regressions rely on a small sample, we present them in the Appendix in table A.IX. 







establishment “births” and “deaths” and firm start-ups and shutdowns.27 The BDS data are 
available only at the US MSA level and provide information from 1977 until 2014. They cover 
a wide range of industrial sectors including agriculture, manufacturing, wholesale trade, retail 
trade, and services. Following Kerr and Nanda (2009), we define entrepreneurship as the entry 
of new establishments, but we will also distinguish whether these establishments are related to 
newly created firms as opposed to already existing companies. We provide the resultant 
descriptive statistics on all variables in Table I. 
We collect the data on our main dependent variables for our financing and employment in 
high tech analyses from several sources. We access the Thompson 1 database for information 
on the reliance on venture capital financing (in USD amounts per capita) in a given area. From 
the US Census County Business Patterns we obtain data on the industry composition of the full 
set of establishments in the MSAs. This information is useful to construct the proportion of 
establishments (and the related proportion of the labor force) engaged in high-tech activities. 
Like Decker, Haltiwanger, Jarmin and Miranda (2018) and Foster, Grim, Haltiwanger and Wolf 
(2018)), we use the level 1 (i.e., narrower) definition of high tech, which includes, among other 
activities, Internet publishing and broadcasting, semiconductor and other electronic component 
manufacturing, and scientific research and development services (see Table 4 in Hecker (2005) 
for the full list). 
Turning to possible channels through which inequality can affect entrepreneurial dynamism, 
we collect schooling information on the percentage and total amount of school financing 
                                                 
27 The BDS describes an establishment as a fixed physical location where economic activity occurs. Firms are 
defined at the enterprise level such that all establishments under the operational control of the enterprise are 
considered part of the firm (see https://www.census.gov/ces/dataproducts/bds/methodology.html#coverage). The 
BDS data excludes self-employed and domestic service workers who do not necessarily engage in entrepreneurial 
activities. 







coming from local sources, as well as the total amount of school expenditures per pupil from 
the Annual Survey of School System Finances set up by the Census Bureau. We obtain judges’ 
sentencing data from 2005 from the Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) for the 75 most populous 
US counties. What is particularly useful from this data source is the sentencing length, which 
we use as a proxy for judicial efficiency, also relating it to our inequality measures. We 
download the various state and MSA characteristics from the US Census Bureau. 
We retrieve data on homesteading intensity, which we use as instrumental variable for our 
contemporary inequality measures, from the Bureau of Land Management General Land Office 
Records (BLM GLO records). The records contain information on individual patents (name of 
the individual, plot size, and location, as well as year granted) granted by the Bureau of Land 
Management. We restrict our dataset to those patents that fall under the authority of the original 
Homestead entries from 1862. 
B. Results 
1. Business Dynamics 
We begin by testing how local wealth inequality affects business dynamics in US Metropolitan 
Statistical Areas (MSAs). Table II provides the first estimation results. We relate the local 
measure of inequality based on financial wealth, the Financial Wealth Gini, to the yearly 
number of new establishments per capita, as well as to the total number of establishments that 
become inactive in a given year. 
In Column (1) we start with a univariate OLS estimation that relates establishment entry per 
capita to financial wealth inequality. In Column (2) we repeat the estimation and include state 
and year fixed effects and control for the MSA population as well as a set of basic MSA 







characteristics that also includes the level of MSA Wealth and MSA Real GDP.28 The latter 
specification is our benchmark specification, which serves as a basis from which all-inclusive 
saturation, instrumentation, and alteration can be pursued. Among other things, it controls for 
the level of and change in local house prices to make sure that neither the housing boom of the 
first decade of the twenty-first century nor the subsequent crisis drive the results.29 
In both regressions, we see a negative correlation between financial wealth inequality and 
the number of new establishments per capita, which is statistically significant at the 1 percent 
level. The economic significance is sizable: a one standard deviation increase in wealth 
inequality reduces the number of new establishments per capita by between 8.7 percent and 9.8 
percent, corresponding to a reduction of about 19 establishments per 100,000 of MSA 
inhabitants. In Specification (3), we explore whether our basic result is driven by a “fat left 
tail”—that is, that more unequal MSAs tend to have higher poverty rates or because more 
unequal MSA may be ethnically more diverse (Alesina, Baqir and Easterly (1999)). We control 
for these factors by including the percentage of the population in poverty and the percentage of 
white people living in the MSA. While we still find a negative (and statistically significant) 
coefficient for financial wealth inequality we find little effect of poverty and the percentage of 
white people living in the MSA on business formation. In Specification (4) we add state-year 
fixed effects. 
                                                 
28 The basic MSA controls are MSA Financial and Housing Wealth, MSA Catholic-to-Protestant Ratio, MSA Land 
Size, MSA Real GDP, MSA House Price Index (Level), MSA House Price Index (Change), Change in MSA Age 
Composition, and Urban MSA, a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the population density of the MSA is 
above the sample average, and 0 otherwise. 
29 It also important to recall that the inclusion of year fixed effects controls for annual changes in the stock market 
index. 







In Column (5) we control for MSA’s income inequality. We add a new independent variable, 
Earned Income Gini, which is defined as the Gini coefficient of the distribution of income 
measured as the sum total of wages and total profit and losses coming from entrepreneurial 
activities as reported in the IRS/SOI data.30 The result is very interesting. First, the estimated 
coefficient on the Financial Wealth Gini is, as before, negative and statistically significant. 
Second, the Earned Income Gini has a positive coefficient that is also economically relevant: a 
standard deviation increase in the Income Gini increases establishment entry by 3.4 percent, 
corresponding to an increase of about 10 establishments per 100,000 MSA inhabitants. 
In sum, wealth inequality slows entrepreneurship while income inequality spurs it. The latter, 
positive effect exerted by income inequality would be consistent with “a supply side scenario” 
(Saez (2017)), whereby local opportunities to earn more (as reflected in recent local income 
distribution) incentivize people to work harder and create more companies. 
Column (6) looks at total establishment exits per capita. These variables’ economic 
relevancy is practically similar: a one-standard-deviation increase in MSA wealth inequality 
decreases the number of establishments that become inactive by approximately 8 percent, 
indicating that business formation (i.e., establishment entries and exits) is less dynamic in more 
unequal metropolitan areas. Additionally, this result confirms that larger values of wealth 
inequality are related to lower business dynamics. In the spirit of Kerr and Nanda (2009), we 
also divide establishment exits between Churning exits (establishment closures within 36 
months of formation) and Schumpeterian exits (closures beyond 36 months).31 We present the 
results in Columns (7) and (8). Remarkably, wealth inequality has a negative impact on both 
                                                 
30 In order to measure earned income we sum the information about salary, stipends, and profit and losses (as 
reported in Schedule C and Schedule F) as reported by the IRS/SOI data. 
31 The US census provides this information until 2012. This explains the lower number of observations in Columns 
(7) and (8). 







Churning and Schumpeterian exits. The economic significance is also similar: a one-standard-
deviation increase in wealth inequality reduces both the Churning and Schumpeterian exits by 
approximately 8 percent.32 
2. Instrumental Variable Analysis 
In this section, we tackle the endogeneity issue by performing an IV analysis. We use the 
proportion of land distributed via the Homestead Act in the first ten years following 1862 if the 
MSA was already settled, and the first ten years since the first settlement for MSAs that were 
settled later. In Table III we present the regression with the Financial Wealth Gini, whereas we 
report the results on the Housing Wealth Gini in Appendix Table A.VII and Land Gini 1880 in 
Table A.VIII. 
Table III presents both the coefficient of the instrumental variables and the F-statistic of the 
first stage. In every specification, the coefficient of Proportion of Homesteaded Land is negative 
and statistically significant. This means that a higher proportion of land homesteaded in the 
early years of the Act (or the early years of the settlement of the area) is negatively related to 
the contemporary measure of wealth inequality. This is in line with our conjecture that more 
homesteading may have promoted a more equal distribution of resources. The F-statistics are 
always above 10, which indicates that the proportion of land assigned via homesteading yields 
a powerful first stage. This result is also confirmed by the partial R-square of the excluded 
instrument in the first stage regression: 5 percent, a large value when we compare it to the 
examples reported by Jiang (2017). 
                                                 
32 We consider the results with other measures of wealth inequality in the Appendix, Table A.V. We also present 
the full set of results concerning wealth and income inequality in Table A.VI. 







Table III Column (1) presents the baseline specification that corresponds to the controls we 
use in our specification in Table II Column (2). We observe that the coefficient of the Financial 
Wealth Gini is negative and statistically significant at the 1 percent level confirming the OLS 
results. The economic significance is a bit larger than in the OLS regressions: the number of 
new establishments per capita declines with about 15 percent when we increase wealth 
inequality by one standard deviation. This corresponds to a decline of about 32 establishments 
per 100,000 MSA inhabitants. 
Column (2) adds three controls to the specification in Column (1). The amount of land 
available for homesteading depended on whether there was a railroad or a canal in the area. 
When there was, railroad and canal land would have been given by the federal government to 
the respective companies managing the lines and the waterworks (Gates (1936)). We control 
for two dummy variables that indicate whether there was a canal present in or a railroad passing 
through the area in 1860. Also, the amount of land to be homesteaded may have depended on 
the presence of Native American tribes in the area, as it has been reported that the homesteading 
policy was also used to mobilize settlers against Native Americans (Allen (1991)). We control 
for a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if there were recorded Native American tribes in 
the area in 1860 and 0 otherwise. Again, the coefficient on Financial Wealth Inequality is 
negative and statistically significant at the 1 percent level.  
The specifications in Columns (3), (4), and (5) check whether homesteading may have a 
direct impact on entrepreneurship today by reflecting or affecting the value of farmland. In 
Column (3), we add the average value of the land in the MSA between 1870 and 1950 as an 
additional control. In Column (4), we consider a denser set of fixed effects, and control for 
state-year fixed effects. In Column (5), we repeat the specification of Column (4), but we 







exclude the states that were affected by the Dust Bowl phenomena of the 1930s. Also in these 
cases, the coefficient on Financial Wealth Inequality remains negative and statistically 
significant at the 1 percent level and maintains a similar economic significance compared to the 
previous specifications.33 
The specifications in Columns (6) and (7) tackle concerns related to the quality of human 
capital. Column (6) reconsiders the full sample and adds an extra control: the proportion of 
individuals in the MSA in 1860 that could not write. Column (7) excludes the states where no 
land was assigned via the Homestead Act to control whether there was anything special about 
people migrating to the West that may affect our results.34 
We also verify our identification assumptions in the data. The quasi-random allocation of 
land originated by the Homestead movement would imply that there is no relationship between 
the future value of farmland and the proportion of land allotted via the Homestead Act. We see 
whether this is true by relating the value of farmland in various years between 1870 and 1959 
to our instrument, MSA homesteading intensity. We report the results in Appendix Table A.X. 
In none of the specifications do we find a statistically significant relationship between the value 
                                                 
33 More in general, initial conditions related to the quality of arable land and the availability of natural resources 
may explain why the 2SLS point estimates are larger than the OLS estimates. Hughes and Cain (2010) (pp. 31‒
35) describe the regions that in our sample display high levels of wealth inequality as areas with particularly fertile 
land and a good climate for agriculture during the colonial period. Good land quality could set unequal regions on 
a good path to economic development from the outset. To the extent that the OLS regressions do not control for 
them, favorable initial conditions would be jointly correlated with more inequality and more business formation, 
generating a type of endogeneity that would work against us finding a result. As our instrument does not appear to 
be correlated with initial soil conditions and future farm values, it alleviates this concern and generates estimates 
that are in absolute value larger than the OLS coefficients. 
34 In Table A.IX in the Appendix, we present the regressions on the Georgia land lottery, a setting that enables us 
to control for the possible differences in the quality of human capital of the settlers. The results confirm our 
previous findings and indicate a negative relationship between wealth inequality and new establishments per 
capita. 







of the land and the instrument. The sign of the relationships also changes depending on the type 
of controls we use. 
Last but not least, we control for possible spatial correlation of the residuals, which may 
affect the statistical inference in a long-run analysis similar to that which we undertake in the 
IV regressions (see Kelly (2019)). We present these results in the Appendix, where we allow 
for spatial correlation using a variety of distance cutoffs (see Table A.XI and section B of the 
Appendix). In every specification, the F-statistic is always above 10 and the results of the 
second stage are basically unaltered.35 
3. Type of Establishment and Income Growth 
Table IV studies in greater depth the characteristics of new establishment creation and relates 
them to local wealth inequality. A recent stream of literature has looked at the quality and type 
of entrepreneurs as an important source of economic growth. In principle, businesses dedicated 
to the development of new technologies and product/service innovation should generate higher 
levels of economic growth (La Porta and Shleifer (2008); La Porta and Shleifer (2014); Levine 
and Rubinstein (2016); Levine and Rubinstein (2018)). 
Columns (1) and (2) look at the proportion of high-tech establishments operating in the MSA 
and find that in more unequal MSAs the proportion of high-tech establishments is lower. A 
standard deviation increase in wealth inequality leads to a reduction of about 30 percent in the 
proportion of high-tech establishments in the area. Columns (3) and (4) study the proportion of 
                                                 
35 In an additional test, we also field past local weather conditions to form an alternative set of six instruments 
(Engerman and Sokoloff (1997); Engerman and Sokoloff (2002)). In particular, we use the average and standard 
deviation for 1895‒2003 of both precipitation and temperature in the MSA, and the soil salinity and depth in the 
MSA. Estimates for these IV regressions can be found in Appendix Table A.XII and confirm our main findings so 
far. In unreported analyses, we also rerun all of above specifications restricting our sample to end in 2006. The 
results remain largely unaffected, indicating that the financial crisis is not driving our findings. 







employment in high-tech sectors and again find that wealth inequality is negatively associated 
with the share of labor employed in high-tech sectors. Taken together these results suggests that 
more equal areas are more engaged in high tech and product/service innovation. 
We further delve into this issue in Columns (5) and (6), where we field as a dependent 
variable the Amount of Venture Capital Investment per Capita. Venture capital investment can 
be considered another proxy for engagement in high tech, as it is usually employed in the 
financing of ventures involving the developments of new products, services, and technologies. 
In both specifications we find a negative coefficient that is also economically large. A standard 
deviation increase in wealth inequality leads to a decline of between 39 and 57 percent in 
venture capital investment per capita. 
Columns (7) and (8) look at the type of establishments created and in particular at the 
proportion of establishments, in the MSA, founded by already existing firms.36 Existing firms 
may have more financial capacity to support new businesses and more know-how with which 
to overcome institutional constraints just because they build up experience and social networks. 
Our results reveal that in more unequal areas there is a higher proportion of new establishment 
creation by firms already in existence. A standard deviation increase in wealth inequality leads 
to an increase of between 2.1 and 8.4 percent in the proportion of new establishments set up by 
existing firms. Mirroring these results, Columns (9) and (10) show that in more unequal MSAs 
there is a lower proportion of establishments created by newly founded firms. 
Columns (11) and (12) assess whether more unequal areas also display a different pattern of 
income per capita growth. In the IV regression, we find that unequal MSAs have lower growth 
of income per capita. A standard deviation increase in the Financial Wealth Gini reduces the 
                                                 
36 We define a firm as “existing” if it has been in operation for at least five years according the census data. 







growth rate by about 10 percent. This result suggests that lower business formation levels also 
translate into lower income-per-capita growth rates. 
IV. An Investigation of the Channels: Wealth Inequality and Local Public 
Goods 
Our analysis so far has identified a reduced-form relationship between wealth inequality and 
business formation. It is important to understand the mechanism underlying our results. As we 
outlined in Section II, there are a number of explanations that can account for the negative 
relationship between wealth inequality and the quality/quantity of entrepreneurship in an area. 
We focus in particular on the channels based on redistribution and public good provision.37 
These explanations involve clear predictions on the number of redistributive policies that a 
society intends to undertake. However, the sign remains unclear: On the one hand, Alesina and 
Rodrik (1994) and Persson and Tabellini (1994) state that more wealth inequality increases the 
probability of future redistribution and income tax rises. On the other hand, Alesina, Baqir and 
Easterly (1999) and Glomm and Lagunoff (1999) suggest that more inequality comes with less 
redistribution and a lower provision of public goods. 
A. Local Campaign Contributions 
We first tackle this issue by looking at how societies express their preferences for redistributive 
policies and in particular we study campaign contributions between 2004 and 2014 in local and 
state elections as a way to understand the attitudes of a community toward such policies. If 
more inequality leads to fewer redistributive policies, we may expect candidates with platforms 
                                                 
37 The evidence on the credit channel can be found in the Appendix, Tables A.XIII, A.XIV, A.XV and A.XVI. 







involving lower taxes and less provision of public goods to receive more/larger campaign 
contributions in more unequal MSAs.38 We obtain political campaign contributions data from 
Bonica (2014). The data covers campaign contributions in the context of federal, state, and local 
elections. As we analyze the effects of local wealth inequality on local outcomes, we consider 
only contributions involving state and local elections. The recipients of contributions in the data 
are individuals (or related committees) that ran for election (both primary and main elections) 
but did not necessarily win. 
The data includes the total amount in contributions received by each candidate and a measure 
of her or his ideology that, among other elements, measures her or his preference for 
redistribution. For state elections we consider individuals running for governor or for state 
congress. For local elections we consider any election for the governing councils of local areas, 
such as city mayor, city council, county commissioners, supervisors, and executives, as well as 
school and academic boards. 
The ideology score encompasses many issues relevant in politics, including the environment, 
moral concerns, and social policies.39 Politicians with high ideology scores tend to prefer lower 
taxes and less provision of public goods, while politicians with lower scores have stronger 
preferences for higher taxes and greater provision of public goods. 
We estimate the following equation: 
ln , , 	 	 	 , , , ,			(2) 
                                                 
38 An obvious alternative is to look at the number of votes received by candidates and relate them to their platforms 
in terms of their stance on redistribution and local wealth inequality. Unfortunately, detailed voting data for state 
and local elections are not available. Several studies, however, document a positive relationship between the 
amount in contributions received and the probability of victory (Hogan (2004); Holbrook and Weinschenk (2014)).  
39 The ideology score is constructed by looking at the pattern of donation of each contributor following the 
methodology pioneered by Poole and Rosenthal (1991) (see Bonica (2014) for the details). The advantage of the 
data provided by Professor Bonica is that, unlike any other dataset on political ideology, it also covers state and 
local elections. 







where , ,  denotes the total amount in campaign contributions received by 
candidate i in MSA j in year t,  is candidate fixed effects, and  is MSA×year fixed 
effects.40 The last of these is an important set of fixed effects as they control for any time-varying 
omitted variable at the MSA level. 	 	 	 ,  identifies 
the interaction term between local wealth inequality and the ideology score.41 Wealth inequality 
is defined as the Financial Wealth Gini. High Ideology Score is a dummy variable that takes the 
value of 1 if the ideology score is above the sample median and 0 otherwise.42 A positive 
(negative)  would suggest that candidates with high ideology scores receive larger (smaller) 
contributions in more unequal MSAs. 
We present the estimates in Table V. In Columns (1) and (2) we show the results for local 
elections. Both in the OLS and the IV specification, the coefficient on the interaction term is 
positive and statistically significant indicating that, in more unequal MSAs, candidates with an 
above median ideology score receive larger campaign contributions.43 The economic effect is 
large: a standard deviation increase in wealth inequality increases the total of contributions by 
16‒33 percent. This result suggests that in more unequal areas, candidates proposing less 
redistribution received more/larger campaign contributions. 
                                                 
40 Relevant for the analysis, MSA-year fixed effects also controls for differences in political campaign regulations 
in different locations. 
41 For ease of exposition we omitted the variable 	 	 ,  in Equation (4). We always control for 
this variable although it is very persistent throughout time and hence almost perfectly collinear with candidate 
fixed effects. 
42 We construct this dummy variable to simplify the interpretation of the results by providing a straightforward 
estimate of its economic relevancy. Results would be the same if we just used the original ideology score. 
43 We follow the procedure used by Tsoutsoura (2015) and instrument Wealth Inequality x High Ideology Score 
with Proportion of Land Homesteaded in the MSA x High Ideology Score. In the political campaign regressions in 
Table IX, we always include MSA×year fixed effects. As a result, in the first stage of the IV, the Proportion of 
Land Homesteaded in the MSA alone is fully absorbed by the fixed effects: the F-statistics in Table IX refer to the 
other instrument, Proportion of Land Homesteaded in the MSA x High Ideology Score. 







In a second step, we study whether this finding is driven by contributors located in either 
rich or poor neighborhoods of the MSA. As we outlined in Section II, if more inequality leads 
to less redistributive policies, we may expect the wealthy to be especially unwilling to share 
their resources. We carry out this study by re-estimating Equation (4), splitting the sample 
between contributions made in the poor (i.e., below median wealth) and rich (i.e., above median 
wealth) zip codes in the MSA.44 Column (3) presents the results for zip codes below median 
wealth. The interaction term between the ideology score and wealth inequality is positive and 
not statistically significant. The size of the coefficient is also small: local wealth inequality has 
virtually no impact on the total amount in contributions made in poor neighborhoods. Column 
(4) considers above median wealth zip codes. The interaction term between ideology score and 
MSA wealth inequality is positive and statistically significant. This indicates that wealth 
inequality leads to larger contributions to candidates proposing less redistribution, especially in 
wealthy neighborhoods. The economic importance is large: a standard deviation increase in 
MSA wealth inequality leads to an increase of about 15 percent of campaign contributions to 
candidates with high ideology scores. 
Columns (5) and (6) check whether inequality leads to candidates with high ideology scores 
receiving larger campaign contributions also in state elections.45 In line with the previous 
findings, also these results suggest that wealth inequality is positively related to preferences for 
                                                 
44 Splitting the sample between contributions received in below/above median zip codes does not guarantee that 
(1) the number of observations in each subsample will be the same and (2) the sum of the observations in the two 
subsamples will be equal to the number of observations in the full sample. This happens because local elections 
include elections in geographical units that can be either “large” (like counties) or “small” (like cities and school 
districts). Election candidates in large administrative units can receive contributions from both above and below 
median wealth zip codes and will appear in both subsamples, thus explaining (2). Candidates in administrative 
units that are “small” receive contributions only in a subsection of zip codes within the MSA, possibly only the 
very poor or the very rich, thus explaining (1). 
45 We use state elections to validate the results on local elections as states are often co-responsible with the local 
authorities for organizing local public life. 







candidates who propose less redistributive policies. A standard deviation increase in wealth 
inequality increases campaign contributions to candidates with an above median ideology score 
by about 10‒18 percent.46 
B.  Provision of Public Goods 
We further explore the idea that wealth inequality leads to less redistribution in Table VI, where 
we relate local wealth inequality to various measures of local public goods provision. Public 
goods can be seen as a form of redistribution from the wealthier to the poorer: if wealth 
inequality is associated with less redistribution, in more unequal areas the quality/quantity of 
public goods supplied should be lower. We focus in particular on education and on the 
efficiency of the civil justice system, both local public goods that have been shown to support 
entrepreneurship and be important for economic growth.47 
First, we relate wealth inequality to education and schooling, presenting the results in 
Columns (1) to (6). The analysis shows that, in more unequal MSAs, both the proportion of 
public school revenue coming from local sources and the school expenditure per pupil are 
lower. A standard deviation increase in inequality decreases the proportion by 15‒20 percent 
and the expenditure per pupil by 4‒7 percent. Moreover, the proportion of individuals with 
some years of college is also lower in more unequal MSAs (see Columns (5) and (6)). A 
                                                 
46 A possible concern is that the data on contributions does not fully reveal the total amount of financial support 
received by a candidate. Since 2010, “Super PACs”, a particular form of Political Action committee, have been 
allowed to financially support political candidates without making direct contributions to their campaigns. Our 
data does not include Super PACs’ contributions and may not reveal the full pattern of financial support received 
by candidates in each MSA. Note, however, that (1) Super PACs tend to be more influential in federal rather than 
local elections; (2) we rerun our regression considering only pre-2010 election cycles, when Super PACs did not 
exist yet, and the results still hold. 
47 It has been shown that the quality of schooling positively affects standard school testing outcomes (Fryer and 
Levitt (2004)). Levine and Rubinstein (2016) shows that individuals with better school testing outcomes are more 
likely to become entrepreneurs, i.e., individuals engaged in growth-enhancing entrepreneurial activities. 







standard deviation increase in inequality results in an approximately 6 percent lower proportion 
of educated individuals. 
Finally, from Column (7) to Column (10), we assess the effect of local wealth inequality on 
the judiciary. We investigate how local inequality affects judicial efficiency as measured by the 
length of time to verdict for a first-degree civil trial. We obtain data on individual civil cases 
from the Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) for 2005. The BJS reports data on civil litigations 
for the 75 most populous US counties, which we aggregate at the MSA level. At the individual 
case level, we observe whether the number of days (its natural logarithm) it takes to come to a 
verdict in a case is affected by local inequality.48 We observe that local inequality matters for 
judicial decision-making. When controlling for both state fixed effects and case controls (in the 
form of a set of dummy variables that controls for the nature of the case, such as breaching of 
a contract, intentional tort, or partnership dispute), the findings suggest that, in more unequal 
MSAs, court rulings take more time (about 22 percent more in our usual standard deviation 
assessment) and therefore are less efficient.49 In the same spirit, we use violent crimes per capita 
as a rough proxy of the efficiency of the judicial and police system of the MSA and see whether 
more unequal MSAs also have a higher number of violent crimes per capita. We present these 
results in Columns (9) and (10) and find that this is indeed the case. A standard deviation 
increase in inequality raises violent crimes per capita by about 32 percent in the IV 
specification. 
  
                                                 
48 We compute the number of days starting from the day when the case is filed until the day when a verdict is 
pronounced. 
49 Together with the dummies indicating the typology of the case and our standard sets of controls, the judicial 
efficiency regressions also include the number of plaintiffs and the number of defendants, whether the trial was a 
jury or a bench trial, and whether the case was resolved via arbitration, as additional controls. 







C. Horserace Analysis 
While there is a vast literature on the effects of education and the efficiency of the judicial 
system on economic growth and business formation, in the last piece of our analysis, Table VII 
investigates whether the impact that public goods have on local entrepreneurship is related to 
wealth inequality. We take the version of our equation from Table II Column (2), controlling 
for state × year fixed effects and we included the schooling and violent crimes measures 
together with wealth inequality. If the mediated effect is important, we would expect the 
coefficient relating wealth inequality to business formation to become smaller once we control 
for local public goods. 
Column (1) presents the regression relating inequality to business formation without 
controlling for any public goods measure, but restricting it to the years in which every schooling 
variable is available. In Column (2), we repeat the estimation of Column (1) including the 
schooling variables. We see that the coefficient on the Financial Wealth Gini declines by around 
40 percent once we include schooling, a result in line with the notion that wealth inequality has 
a mediating effect on entrepreneurship via public goods, and especially schooling. Columns (3) 
and (4) repeat the same exercise with violent crimes. In this case the coefficient declines little, 
by about 8 percent, suggesting that schooling is a more relevant mediating factor for our results. 
In the Appendix, we also check the relative importance of wealth inequality on credit 
markets and compare it with the importance of the public goods channel. In the horserace 
analysis we present in Table A.XV, we find that the credit channel and the public goods channel 
have roughly the same importance in explaining business formation. The coefficient on wealth 
inequality declines about 35 percent once we include credit market controls, a similar decline 
of what we find for local public goods. 







Overall, we conclude that the results point in the direction that inequality also affects the 
quality of local institutions in the form of financial sector development, education, and judicial 
efficiency. 
We also run a formal analysis of the causality chain using the methodology developed by 
Becker and Woessmann (2009). We estimate a simultaneous equation model where in the first 
stage we relate wealth inequality to the proportion of land assigned via the Homestead Act in 
the MSA. In a second stage we regress the quality of local institutions on wealth inequality. In 
the third stage, we relate institutional quality to entrepreneurship. See Appendix B for details 
and Table A.XVI for the results. 
V. Conclusions 
We empirically test hypotheses showing how household wealth inequality may determine 
entrepreneurial dynamism. The relationship between wealth inequality and entrepreneurship is 
in theory ambiguous. On the one hand, local wealth inequality may be associated with low 
levels of entrepreneurship. On the other hand, inequality may help entrepreneurship by 
supporting local demand and generating more savings and investment. 
In our empirical analysis, we employ multiple measures of wealth inequality at the US 
metropolitan statistical area level. To alleviate endogeneity problems, we saturate specifications 
with comprehensive sets of local fixed effects and characteristics and estimate instrumental 
variable models relying on the 1862 Homestead Act. 
The estimated coefficients suggest that local-level wealth inequality robustly decreases firm 
creation and exit and is associated with less high-tech activity. The relationship between wealth 
inequality and entrepreneurial dynamism can be mediated by various factors. We find that more 







unequal communities prefer less redistributive policies and consequently have lower local 
expenditures on schooling and a lower proportion of educated people in the area. Our findings 
also suggest the presence of a less effective judiciary in more unequal MSAs. Additionally, we 
observe that higher inequality MSAs display lower personal income per capita growth. 
Overall, our findings suggest that inequality in local household wealth impedes 
entrepreneurial dynamism through a deterioration in schooling and justice, and that to address 
rising inequality (while preserving entrepreneurial dynamism), policy actions focusing on 
wealth rather than income should be considered. 
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FINANCIAL AND HOUSING WEALTH INEQUALITY
FIGURE 1
NOTES. The figure maps our measures of household wealth inequality across US metropolitan statistical areas. The
Financial Wealth Gini is the Gini coefficient of the distribution of wealth as measured by the distribution of the
amount of declared dividends from household tax filings in the metropolitan statistical area. The Housing Wealth





















NOTES. The figure maps the entry of new establishments per capita versus our measures of household
wealth inequality across US metropolitan statistical areas. Total Establishments Entry per Capita is the
yearly total number of new establishments in the MSA between 2005‐2014 divided by total MSA
population. The Financial Wealth Gini is the Gini coefficient of the distribution of wealth as measured by
the distribution of the amount of declared dividends from household tax filings in the metropolitan
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BUSINESS FORMATION AND WEALTH INEQUALITY FROM 1977 TO 2014
FIGURE 3
NOTES. The top panel displays the number of establishments entry per capita and the US wide Gini index of wealth
inequality. The bottom panel displays the number of establishments entry per existing establishments and also displays the
US wide Gini index of wealth inequality. Sources: US Census Bureau and Kuhn, Schularick and Steins (2019). Wealth






























































































































































































































































































































































Units Mean Median Standard Deviation 1st Percentile 99th Percentile
Dependent Variables
Total Establishments Entry per Capita 4,026 2.15 2.00 0.83 1.00 4.59
Total Establishments Exit per Capita 4,026 1.95 1.84 0.67 1.01 3.96
Total Establishments Exit per Capita (Churning) 3,285 0.70 0.63 0.32 0.28 1.77
Total Establishments Exit per Capita (Shumpeterian) 3,285 1.31 1.26 0.42 0.68 2.44
Proportion of New Establishments Created by Existing Firms 3,285 0.30 0.30 0.06 0.17 0.46
Proportion of New Establishments Created by Newly Founded Firms 3,276 0.65 0.65 0.06 0.50 0.78
Venture Capital Investment Divided by MSA Population 4,026 42.22 0.00 212.07 0.00 836.49
Proportion of High-Tech Establishments 3,960 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.09
Proportion of Employment in High-Tech 3,960 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.16
Income per Capita Growth 3,540 % 0.03 0.04 0.04 -0.07 0.11
Entrepeneur's Net Worth 525 USD 781,815 127,000 7,523,007 0 5,275,000
Amount of Campaign Contribution (Local) 80,801 USD 5,441 500 66,201 10 77,574
Amount of Campaign Contribution (State) 737,211 USD 12,504 500 362,178 10.00 139,389
Proportion of Public School Revenue coming from Local Sources 3,948 0.41 0.40 0.13 0.13 0.72
MSA School Expenditure per Pupil 3,948 USD 5707 5145 4934 3170 13796
Inflow of Individuals with at Least a College Degree 2,196 % 54 53 8 36 76
Judicial Efficiency 2,417 801 676 510 185 2774
Violent Crimes per Capita 2,483 51 46 27 11 142
Main Independent Variable
Financial Wealth Gini 3,276 - 0.87 0.86 0.04 0.78 0.96
Housing Wealth Gini 3,276 - 0.77 0.77 0.05 0.59 0.86
Mortgaged Housing Wealth Gini 3,213 - 0.77 0.77 0.05 0.64 0.86
No Mortgage Housing Wealth Gini 3,240 - 0.75 0.79 0.13 0.34 0.91
Land 1880 Gini 2,979 - 0.44 0.42 0.13 0.13 0.75
Proportion of Financial Wealth Owned by the Top 10 Percent 3,204 - 0.26 0.22 0.15 0.05 1.00
Proportion of Housing Wealth Owned by the Top 10 Percent 3,105 - 0.53 0.53 0.07 0.38 0.71
Other Measures of Inequality
Earned Income Gini 3,938 0.41 0.41 0.05 0.26 0.54
Instrumental Variables
Homesteading in the First 10 Years of Incorporation of the MSA Area 4,026 0.05 0.00 0.12 0.00 0.63
TABLE I
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR THE EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF BUSINESS FORMATION, JOB CREATION, FINANCING AND INSTITUTIONS
NOTES. The table provides the number of observations, mean, standard deviation, 1st percentile, the median (50th percentile) and the 99th percentile of all variables used in the empirical analysis. The definition of the variables can be found in
Appendix Table A.I.  For the sake of brevity we do not include MSA characteristics separately. Their corresponding descriptives can be found in Table A.II.
E
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Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dependent Variable
ln(MSA Total 
Establishment Exits Per 
Capita)
ln(MSA Total 
Establishment Exits Per 
Capita (Churning))
ln(MSA Total 
Establishment Exits Per 
Capita (Schumpeterian))
Benchmark
Financial Wealth Gini -2.395*** -2.722*** -2.625*** -2.473*** -2.528*** -2.261*** -2.200*** -2.290***
(0.401) (0.446) (0.437) (0.462) (0.538) (0.454) (0.534) (0.469)
MSA Percentage of Inhabitants living in Poverty -0.002 -0.002 -0.000 -0.003 -0.004 -0.003
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Whites to Total Population Ratio 0.002*** 0.004*** 0.003** 0.002 0.003* 0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Earned Income Gini 0.734**
(0.311)
State Fixed Effects No Yes Yes -- -- -- -- --
Year Fixed Effects No Yes Yes -- -- -- -- --
State * Year Fixed Effects No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
MSA Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 4,026 3,773 3,761 3,728 3,728 3,728 3,050 3,050
R-Squared 0.075 0.723 0.724 0.741 0.764 0.658 0.714 0.588
Economic Relevancy (Gini Standard Deviation) -8.7% -9.8% -9.5% -9.0% -9.2% -8.2% -8.0% -8.3%
TABLE II
MAIN SPECIFICATIONS EXPLAINING BUSINESS FORMATION
NOTES. The dependent variables are defined as: the natural logarithm of the yearly total number of new establishments in the MSA between 2004-2014 divided by total MSA population; the natural logarithm of the yearly total number of establishments that
became inactive in the MSA between 2004-2014 divided by total MSA population; the natural logarithm of the yearly total number of establishments that became inactive in the MSA within 36 months of opening between 2004-2012 divided by total MSA
population; and the natural logarithm of the yearly total number of establishments that became inactive in the MSA after 36 months of opening between 2004-2012 divided by total MSA population. The Financial Wealth Gini is defined as the Gini coefficient
of the distribution of wealth as measured by the distribution of the amount of declared dividends from household tax filings in the MSA. All other variables are defined in Appendix Table A.I. All Models are estimated with a linear regression (OLS) model.
MSA controls include MSA Estimated Total Financial and Housing Wealth, MSA Catholic to Protestant Ratio, MSA Land Size, MSA Real GDP, MSA House Price Index (Level), MSA House Price Index (Change), Change in MSA Age Composition, MSA
Population Growth and a dummy variable (Urban MSA) that takes the value of 1 if the MSA population density is above the sample median. "Yes" indicates that the set of fixed effects or controls is included. "No" indicates that the set of fixed effects or
controls is not included. "--" indicates that the indicated set of fixed effects or controls are comprised in the wider included set of fixed effects. Estimated coefficients are reported in each first row with standard errors below (in parentheses) that are clustered
at the State level. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
ln(MSA Total Establishment Entries Per Capita)
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Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dependent Variable
Sample / Specification





Financial Wealth Gini -4.315** -3.555** -3.797*** -3.710*** -3.334*** -3.698*** -3.693**
(1.638) (1.439) (1.296) (1.280) (1.194) (1.340) (1.492)
Railroad Line in the MSA in 1860 -0.046 -0.046 -0.042 -0.034 -0.042 -0.061
(0.030) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.054)
Water Canal in the MSA in 1860 -0.033 -0.033 -0.036 -0.038 -0.036* -0.074**
(0.023) (0.022) (0.021) (0.023) (0.021) (0.030)
Native American Tribes in the MSA in 1860 0.020 0.019 0.020 0.017 0.020 0.027
(0.019) (0.020) (0.019) (0.023) (0.019) (0.035)
Historical Farm Values -0.037 -0.028 -0.028 -0.029 0.022
(0.041) (0.040) (0.040) (0.039) (0.054)
Illiteracy -0.013 -0.346
(0.235) (0.264)
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes -- -- -- --
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes -- -- -- --
State × Year Fixed Effects No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
MSA Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
IV Coefficient First Stage -0.059*** -0.063*** -0.066*** -0.065*** -0.069*** -0.062*** -0.060***
F-Statistic First Stage 11.611 12.577 14.707 15.140 16.566 14.932 14.582
Number of Observations 3,773 3,773 3,740 3,707 3,267 3,707 1,936
R-Squared 0.709 0.721 0.719 0.736 0.737 0.736 0.726
Economic Relevancy (Gini Standard Deviation) -15.1% -12.6% -13.4% -13.1% -11.6% -13.1% -12.1%
TABLE III
MAIN SPECIFICATIONS EXPLAINING BUSINESS FORMATION: INSTRUMENTED
NOTES. The dependent variable is defined as the natural logarithm of the yearly total number of new establishments in the MSA between 2004-2014 divided by total MSA population. The Financial Wealth Gini is defined as the Gini coefficient of the
distribution of wealth as measured by the distribution of the amount of declared dividends from household tax filings in the MSA. All other variables are defined in Appendix Table A.I. All Models are estimated with a 2SLS estimator. MSA controls include
MSA Estimated Total Financial and Housing Wealth, MSA Catholic to Protestant Ratio, MSA Land Size, MSA Real GDP, MSA House Price Index (Level), MSA House Price Index (Change), Change in MSA Age Composition, MSA Population Growth, and
a dummy variable (Urban MSA) that takes the value of 1 if the MSA population density is above the sample median. "Yes" indicates that the set of fixed effects or controls is included. "No" indicates that the set of fixed effects or controls is not included. "--"
indicates that the indicated set of fixed effects or controls are comprised in the wider included set of fixed effects. Estimated coefficients are reported in each first row with standard errors below (in parentheses) that are clustered at the State level. ***, ** and *
indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
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Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Dependent Variable
Model OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
Financial Wealth Gini -0.269*** -0.251** -0.307*** -0.566** -10.428*** -15.021* 0.168*** 0.668*** -0.089* -0.660** -0.009 -0.082*
(0.029) (0.123) (0.069) (0.249) (3.478) (8.653) (0.058) (0.242) (0.052) (0.272) (0.015) (0.047)
State × Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
MSA Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F-Statistic First Stage -- 15.171 -- 15.171 -- 15.14 -- 15.374 -- 15.374 -- 15.157
Number of Observations 3,734 3,701 3,734 3,701 3,740 3,707 3,060 3,033 3,060 3,033 3,400 3,370
R-Squared 0.714 0.715 0.439 0.414 0.573 0.574 0.678 0.650 0.650 0.612 0.690 0.694
Economic Relevancy (Gini Standard Deviation) -32.7% -30.6% -40.0% -40.0% -39.6% -57.0% 2.1% 8.4% -0.5% -3.9% -1.2% -9.9%
NOTES. The dependent variables are defined as: the number of high-tech establishments in the MSA divided by the total number of establishments; the proportion of employment in high-tech firms in the MSA; the total
amount of venture capital invested in the MSA between 2004 and 2014 divided by total population in the MSA; the number of new establishments created in the MSA by firms that have been active for at least 10 years
divided by the total number of new establishments; the number of new establishments created in the MSA by newly created firms divided by the total number of new establishments and the percent change of MSA total
income per capita. The Financial Wealth Gini is defined as the Gini coefficient of the distribution of wealth as measured by the distribution of the amount of declared dividends from household tax filings in the MSA. All
other variables are defined in Appendix Table A.I. Uneven numbered models are estimated with a linear regression (OLS) model while even numbered models are estimated with a 2SLS IV model. MSA controls include
MSA Estimated Total Financial and Housing Wealth, MSA Catholic to Protestant Ratio, MSA Land Size, MSA Real GDP, MSA House Price Index (Level), MSA House Price Index (Change), Change in MSA Age
Composition, MSA Population Growth, and a dummy variable (Urban MSA) that takes the value of 1 if the MSA population density is above the sample median. The IV estimates also include Railroad Line in the MSA in
1860, Water Canal in the MSA in 1860, Native American Tribes in the MSA in 1860, and Historical Farm Value as additional controls. "Yes" indicates that the set of fixed effects or controls is included. "No" indicates that
the set of fixed effects or controls is not included. Estimated coefficients are reported in each first row with standard errors below (in parentheses) that are clustered at the State level. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the
1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
Income per Capita 
Growth







INEQUALITY AND OTHER OUTCOMES
Proportion of New 
Establishments Created 
by Newly Founded Firms
Venture Capital 
Investment Divided by 
MSA Population
Proportion of High-Tech 
Establishments
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Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent Variable
Sample Below Median Wealth Above Median Wealth
Model OLS IV OLS OLS OLS IV
Financial Wealth Gini * High Score Politician 4.723*** 9.587*** 1.770 4.231*** 2.738*** 4.974***
(1.004) (2.355) (3.247) (1.121) (0.513) (1.648)
CBSA × Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Office × Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Politician Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F-Statistic First Stage -- 14.709 -- -- -- 11.156
Number of Observations 80,801 80,801 19,648 66,514 737,211 737,211
R-Squared 0.401 0.399 0.651 0.431 0.394 0.394
Economic Relevancy (Gini Standard Deviation) 16.1% 33.0% 0.6% 14.4% 9.9% 18.0%
Full Full
TABLE V
INEQUALITY AND CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS
NOTES. The dependent variables are defined as the natural logarithm of the $ amount of campaign contributions received by election candidates for local and state elections. The Financial Wealth Gini is defined as the Gini coefficient of the distribution of
wealth as measured by the distribution of the amount of declared dividends from household tax filings in the MSA. A High Score Politician has stronger preferences for lower taxes and a lower provision of public goods and is defined based on the scores
provided by Bonica (2014). All other variables are defined in Appendix Table A.I. Model (1) is estimated with a linear regression (OLS) model while Model (2) is estimated with a 2SLS IV model. MSA controls include MSA Estimated Total Financial and
Housing Wealth, MSA Catholic to Protestant Ratio, MSA Land Size, MSA Real GDP, MSA House Price Index (Level), MSA House Price Index (Change), Change in MSA Age Composition, MSA Population Growth, and a dummy variable (Urban MSA)
that takes the value of 1 if the MSA population density is above the sample median. The IV estimates also include Railroad Line in the MSA in 1860, Water Canal in the MSA in 1860, Native American Tribes in the MSA in 1860, and Historical Farm Value
as additional controls. "Yes" indicates that the set of fixed effects is included. Estimated coefficients are reported in each first row with standard errors below (in parentheses) that are clustered at the State level. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%
and 10% level respectively.
Campaign Contributions
For Local Elections For State Elections
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Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Dependent Variable
OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
Financial Wealth Gini -1.627*** -2.003*** -0.977** -1.697 -86.706*** -74.554* 5.859*** 5.625* 16.950*** 40.936**
(0.222) (0.721) (0.399) (1.550) (13.107) (41.437) (1.869) (3.123) (4.167) (18.659)
State × Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
MSA Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
F-Statistic First Stage -- 15.287 -- 15.287 -- 15.534 -- 11.002 -- 14.918
Number of Observations 3,707 3,674 3,707 3,674 2,040 2,022 2,417 2,417 2,329 2,308
R-Squared 0.792 0.798 0.727 0.725 0.756 0.758 0.309 0.309 0.593 0.562
Economic Relevancy (Gini Standard Deviation) -15.0% -18.8% -4% -6.4% -6.2% -5.8% 22.2% 21.3% 12.0% 32.0%
NOTES. The dependent variables are defined as: the ratio of yearly public school revenues obtained from local sources in the MSA divided by total public school revenues between 2004-2014; the total amount of yearly public school expenditures per pupil in the MSA between 2004-2014;
the proportion of individuals who had at least some years of college in the MSA between 2009 and 2014. Judicial efficiency is the length of time needed to obtain the verdict for a first-degree civil trial. Violent crimes per capita is the sum of murders, rapes, robberies and assaults divided by
the population in the MSA (in 100,000). The Financial Wealth Gini is defined as the Gini coefficient of the distribution of wealth as measured by the distribution of the amount of declared dividends from household tax filings in the MSA. All other variables are defined in Appendix Table
A.I. Models (2), (4), (6) and (8) are estimated with a 2SLS estimator; all other Models are estimated using OLS. The definition of the variables can be found in Appendix Table A.I. MSA controls include MSA Estimated Total Financial and Housing Wealth, MSA Catholic to Protestant Ratio,
MSA Land Size, MSA Real GDP, MSA House Price Index (Level), MSA House Price Index (Change), Change in MSA Age Composition, and a dummy variable (Urban MSA) that takes the value of 1 if the MSA population density is above the sample median. The IV estimates in Columns
(2), (4), (6) and (8) also include Railroad Line in the MSA in 1860, Water Canal in the MSA in 1860, Native American Tribes in the MSA in 1860, and Historical Farm Value as additional controls. "Yes" indicates that the set of fixed effects is included. "--" indicates that the indicated set of
characteristics or fixed effects are comprised in the wider included set of fixed effects. Estimated coefficients are reported in each first row with standard errors below (in parentheses) that are clustered at the State level. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level
respectively.
Proportion of Public School Revenue 
Coming from Local Sources
TABLE VI
INEQUALITY AND LOCAL PUBLIC GOODS
MSA School Expenditure per Pupil
% of Individuals with at Least Some Years 
of College
Violent Crimes per CapitaJudicial Efficiency
E
lectronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com
/abstract=
2422201
Model (1) (2) (3) (4)
Financial Wealth Gini -2.453*** -1.562** -2.376*** -2.205***
(0.536) (0.617) (0.660) (0.622)
Proportion of Public School Revenue Coming from Local Sources 0.379* 0.310*** 0.604***
(0.199) (0.073) (0.085)
MSA School Expenditure per Pupil -0.020 -0.011 -0.004
(0.042) (0.043) (0.049)
% of Individuals with at Least Some Years of College 0.004*
(0.002)
Violent Crimes Per Capita -0.010*
(0.005)
State × Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
MSA Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 1,700 1,700 2,329 2,329
R-Squared 0.676 0.687 0.73 0.733
Economic Relevancy (Gini Standard Deviation) -9.3% -5.9% -9.0% -8.4%
TABLE VII
HORSERACE OF INEQUALITY WITH LOCAL PUBLIC GOODS
MSA Total Establishment Entries Per Capita
NOTES. All Models are estimated with an OLS model. The dependent variables are expressed in natural logarithms. The definition of the
variables can be found in Appendix Table A.I. MSA controls include MSA Estimated Total Financial and Housing Wealth, MSA Catholic to
Protestant Ratio, MSA Land Size, MSA Real GDP, MSA House Price Index (Level), MSA House Price Index (Change), Change in MSA Age
Composition, and a dummy variable (Urban MSA) that takes the value of 1 if the MSA population density is above the sample median. "Yes"
indicates that the set of fixed effects is included. Estimated coefficients are reported in each first row with standard errors below (in parentheses)
that are clustered at the state level. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
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A. Measuring Wealth Inequality 
It is very difficult to readily obtain representative measures of wealth inequality at the local 
level. Thus, we construct our own two proxies for local wealth inequality. The first, which we 
label Financial Wealth Gini, is based on current levels of financial wealth and broadly based 
on a methodology introduced by Mian, Rao and Sufi (2013) and Saez and Zucman (2016), and 
it intends to construct local-level measures of household net worth; the second measure is based 
on US house ownership data. 
The contemporary measure of wealth inequality looks at amounts in dividends and interest 
earned by US households in 2004, the first year of our sample period, as reported in Internal 
Revenue Service (IRS) Statistics of Income (SOI) data. The IRS/SOI data report the total 
amount of income in dividends and interest received by US households in a given zip code. The 
information is reported as a total per zip code, but also divided into five household income 
groups, ranging from low income to high income. Under the assumption that a typical 
household owns the market index for stocks and bonds, the amount in financial rents it receives 
depends only on the quantity of stocks and bonds it holds. IRS/SOI provides three pieces of 
information important for the construction of our proxy: 
 
(1) The total number of households belonging to each income group; 
(2) For each income group, the number of households who declared non-zero dividend and 
non-zero interest income (we will call these non-zero households); and, 
(3) For each income group, the total amount in dividends and interest earned by all 
households. 
 
We now report the procedure we adopted to construct our inequality proxy. For simplicity, 
we just describe the case where we consider only dividends as a financial rent. The procedure 
is exactly the same when we also include interest income, and comprises six steps. 
 
(1) We aggregate the IRS/SOI figures at the MSA level. 
(2) For each MSA, we compute the number of households who declared zero dividend 
income and we place them into a separate category. 
(3) For each MSA and each income group, we compute the average dividend earned by non-
zero households. We do this by dividing the total amount in dividends for each income group 
by the respective number of non-zero households. 
(4) We assume that each household in the same income group earned the average dividend 
computed in (2). 
(5) We assume that each household owns the same type and composition of stock: the equity 
index. As a result, the amount in dividends received depends only on the quantity of stock 
owned. 
(6) We use the number of non-zero households belonging to each income group, the number 
of households declaring zero dividends, and the average earned in interest and dividends to 
compute a Gini coefficient that measures the distribution of dividend earnings within each 
MSA. Recall that the Gini coefficient is a measure of inequality that ranges between 0 and 1, 
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where a coefficient close to 0 can be interpreted as full equality, whereas a coefficient of 1 
indicates perfect inequality. We perform the same procedure with the interest income data.1 
 
Table A.III provides an example of this computation. Column (1) lists the five income 
groups, Column (2) provides the number of households belonging to each income group, 
Column (3) the number of households declaring a non-zero dividend, and Column (4) the sum 
of all dividends received by all households in each group. 
First, we compute the number of zero-dividend earners by taking the difference between the 
totals of Columns (1) and (2) and reporting it in Column (4) in the row “Households with No 
Dividend Income”. In the remainder of Column (4), we place, per income group, the number of 
households that declared dividends—the figures being the same as those in Column (2). We 
then compute the average dividend earned by non-zero households by dividing the figures in 
Column (3) by those in Column (4); we report this ratio in Column (5). We then compute the 
Gini coefficient, using the six dividend income groups. The first consists of the 1,576,927 
households that earned zero dividends, the second contains the 31,604 households that earn 
1,181 dollars, and so on, up to the seventh group, which is composed of 73,620 households that 
earn about 11,800 dollars in dividends. In this example, the Gini coefficient is equal to 0.91. 
Naturally, this is a proxy, and it may be subject to measurement error. It performs well in 
identifying perfect equality and perfect inequality. In the former case, we would observe each 
household earning the same financial rents independently of the income group it belongs to, 
and our Gini coefficient would correctly have the value of zero. In the latter situation, our data 
would reveal all households but one receiving a financial rent and the Gini coefficient would 
correctly receive the score of one. The proxy does not work very well in every situation where 
in each income group the distribution of dividends is very dispersed around the mean. In these 
situations we underestimate the degree of inequality. Measurement error may produce biased 
estimates of the coefficients when relating wealth inequality to financial outcomes. We will be 
able to alleviate this problem by instrumenting this wealth inequality measure in various 
specifications.2 We will present our main results using a Gini coefficient based on dividends, 
which we label Financial Wealth Gini. Results are basically the same if we use a Gini coefficient 
based on interest income. 
The second group of contemporary measures of wealth inequality are based on 
homeownership data obtained from both the US census and Fannie Mae mortgage databases. 
From the US census database, we obtain information on the number of owner occupied housing 
units (i.e., households) that fully own their house as well as the corresponding value of the 
house. Housing values fall into one of the following categories: below $50,000, between 
$50,000 and $100,000, between $100,000 and $150,000, between $150,000 and 200,000, 
between $200,000 and $300,000, between $300,000 and $500,000, and a value of more than 
$500,000. Given that these properties are free of mortgages, the value of the houses corresponds 
to the household’s housing equity. We use the lowest value of each bin to calculate a Gini index 
of housing inequality, which we label the No Mortgage Housing Wealth Gini. In the Gini index, 
we also include the number of households that rent a house, and we assume they have zero 
housing wealth. 
Note that from the US census database we only have homeowners that fully own their 
houses. In order to include homeowners that do have an outstanding mortgage, we rely on the 
Fannie Mae mortgage database (“Single Family Loan Level data set”), which provides us with 
information on mortgage originations between 1999 and 2004. The Fannie Mae data contains 
                                                 
1 As we do not know the amount of income in dividends and interest each individual household declares, we cannot 
compute a unique Gini coefficient based on the sum of these amounts. 
2 Another possible source of measurement error may come from tax evasion. US financial institutions 
automatically report to the IRS dividend and interest income earned by their clients, making tax evasion through 
US banks virtually impossible. But taxpayers can avoid taxes by holding wealth at foreign banks. 
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information on the MSA where the property is located and the loan-to-value ratio at origination, 
as well as the house value (again at origination). This information enables us to compute 
housing equity, defined as the value of the house in 2004 minus the outstanding mortgage. 
Based upon this data, we calculate a Gini coefficient in a similar spirit as the Gini measures 
based upon the housing information from the US census ACS database. We compute our main 
housing Gini measure by aggregating the information on housing equity obtained from both the 
US census and the Freddie Mac databases and label this variable the Housing Wealth Gini. 
To construct our historical measure of wealth inequality, we obtain information on historical 
farmland plot sizes at the county level from the 1880 US census. More precisely, for each 
county we have information on the total number of farms that—based upon their total acres of 
farmland—fall into a certain size bin. Farms are assigned to one of the following seven bins: 
under 10 acres, from 10 to 19 acres, 20 to 49 acres, 50 to 99 acres, 100 to 499 acres, 500 to 999 
acres, and 1,000 or more acres. 
First, we assume that the lower bound farm size of each bin is the average farm size of all 
the farms in that bin (for the first bin we set the lower bound equal to 0.001). We then aggregate 
the information at the MSA level. Next, we use these lower bounds to calculate an MSA Gini 
coefficient in a similar way to that used in Rajan and Ramcharan (2011).  
We also compute proxies of the amount of financial and housing wealth held by the top 10 
percent of owners ranked according to financial or housing wealth, respectively, which we label 
the Proportion of Financial Wealth Owned by the Top 10 Percent and the Proportion of Housing 
Wealth Owned by the Top 10 Percent. The data is not granular enough to precisely compute 
the exact top 10 percent: in principle, we would like to have individual tax records, but our data 
is aggregate at the income or house value level. The problem is slightly more complicated with 
the IRS/SOI data as it splits households into bins based on their total income and not on income 
coming just from dividends. While it is likely that households with high incomes may also have 
larger dividend earnings, the information we have does not allow us to see that precisely.  
Keeping these caveats in mind, we now present the procedure we adopt to construct our top 
10 percent financial wealth measure. We use the IRS/SOI data as discussed above. For each 
income bin, we compute the average dividend received by the corresponding number of 
households, which we define as the total amount of dividends reported in a certain income bin 
divided by the total number of returns reported in the same bin. We then rank bins in respect to 
the average dividend. We start with the bin with the highest average dividend figure and 
compute the proportion of returns in this bin in respect to the total number of tax returns in the 
MSA. Once we have completed this computation, we face three possibilities: 
 
(1) If the proportion of returns is exactly equal to 10 percent, our procedure concludes here 
and we just compute the proportion of total dividends received by the households in the bin in 
respect to the total dividend amount reported in the entire MSA. This precisely corresponds to 
the amount in dividends/financial wealth held by the top 10 percent of owners when ranked 
according to their wealth. 
(2) If the proportion of returns is more than 10 percent, we compute the subset of tax returns 
within the bin that corresponds to exactly 10 percent of the number of returns. We then multiply 
it by the average dividend earned in this bin and divide it by the total amount in dividends 
received in the MSA. This again provides us with the amount in dividends/financial wealth held 
by the top 10 percent of owners. 
(3) If the proportion of returns is less than 10 percent, we move to the bin with the second 
highest average dividend and we repeat the procedure again, until we reach the 10 percent of 
total tax returns delivered in the MSA. 
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The procedure we use to compute our top 10 percent housing wealth measure is very similar 
to what we just described; the only difference is that we rank each bin in relation to the 
corresponding housing value. 
B. Some Evidence on the Direction of the Causality Chain: A Three-Stage Model 
In order to test more formally the causality chain implied by our argument, and again 
following the methodology of Becker and Woessmann (2009), we write a system of equations 
intended to spell out each component of the causality argument. In particular, we model 
business formation, local institutional quality, and wealth inequality, as follows: 
 
	 	 , , , , , .    
          	 , 	 , , , .    
	 , , , .    
In the system of equations, the first stage predicts MSA wealth inequality based on the 
proportion of land assigned via the Homestead Act. The part of the variation of wealth 
inequality related to the Homestead Act is then employed in the second stage to predict the level 
of local institutional quality. In the third stage, the fitted value of institutions is related to the 
MSA’s number of new establishments per capita. This model is estimated using three-stage 
least squares and the results are reported in Table A.XVI. As in the previous analysis, we restrict 
the analysis to the measures of institutional quality for which we have access to data for a longer 
time series. We see that in the first stage, the proportion of land assigned via the Homestead 
Act is negatively associated with each measure of wealth inequality. In the second stage, with 
the exception of total expenditure, the fitted value of inequality is negatively associated with 
institutional quality. Lastly, in the third stage, institutional quality has a positive association 
with local business formation.3  
 
  
                                                 
3 In principle, one could imagine a more complex system of equations that relates wealth inequality to campaign 
contributions and campaign contributions to public goods. Such a system is, however, beyond the scope of our 
study. 
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Variable Name Variable Definition Source
Dependent Variables
Total Establishments Entry per Capita Total number of new establishments in the MSA between 2005-2014 divided by total MSA population expressed in thousands of inhabitants USC
Total Establishments Exit per Capita Total number of establishments that became inactive in the MSA between 2005-2014 divided by total MSA population expressed in thousands of inhabitants USC
Total Establishments Exit per Capita (Churning) Total number of establishments that became inactive in the MSA within 36 months of opening between 2005-2012 divided by total MSA population expressed in
thousands of inhabitants
USC
Total Establishments Exit per Capita (Shumpeterian) Total number of establishments that became inactive in the MSA beyond 36 months of opening between 2005-2012 divided by total MSA population expressed in
thousands if inhabitants
USC
Entrepreneurs` Net Worth Net worth of of individuals who are about to start a business. Net Worth is defined by the total amount of assets belonging to an individual minus the total amount
of her personal debts
PSED
Proportion of New Establishments Created by Existing Firms Number of new establishments created in the MSA by firms that have been active for at least 10 years divided by the total number of new establishments USC
Proportion of New Establishments Created by Newly Founded Firms Number of new establishments created in the MSA by firms that have been active for less than 10 years divided by the total number of new establishments USC
Proportion of New Establishments Created by Firms That Are Less Than 36 Months Old Number of new establishments created in the MSA by firms that have been active for less than 36 months divided by the total number of new establishments USC
Venture Capital Investment Divided by MSA Population Total Venture Capital Investment in the MSA divided by MSA population (in million $) Thompson 1
Proportion of High-Tech Establishments Number of new high-tech establishments created in the MSA divided by the total number of establishments in the MSA USC
Proportion of Employment in High-Tech The proportion of employment in high-tech firms in the MSA USC
Income per Capita Growth The percent change of MSA total income per capita USC
Amount of Campaign Contribution (Local) Total Amount of Campaign contributions received by a candidate in a local election. Local elections include election in city councils, mayoral elections, counties
and school boards
Bonica (2014)
Amount of Campaign Contribution (State) Total Amount of Campaign contributions received by a candidate in a state election. State elections include gubernatorial and state council elections Bonica (2014)
Proportion of Public School Revenue coming from Local Sources Total School Revenue coming from local sources divided by Total Schools Revenue USC
MSA School Expenditure per Pupil Total School Expenditure in the MSA divided by the number of pupils in the MSA USC
% of Individuals with at least some years of college Percentage of Individuals with at least some years of college or more in the MSA USC
Judicial Efficiency The length of time to the verdict for a first-degree civil trial. BJS
Violent Crimes per Capita Total Number of Violent Crimes divided by population (in 1,000,000) of the MSA. Violent crimes are the sum of murders, rapes, robberies and assaults. FBI
Number of Bank Branches per Capita The number of yearly bank branches in the MSA divided by population FDIC
Total Amount of Loans to Small Businesses per Capita The total amount of loans made to small businesses in USD in the MSA between 2005-2014 FFIEC 
APPENDIX TABLE A.I
VARIABLE NAMES, DEFINITIONS, AND DATA SOURCES FOR THE EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF BUSINESS FORMATION, TYPE, FINANCING AND PUBLIC GOODS
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Wealth Inequality at the State Level The Gini coefficient of the distribution of wealth as measured by households' wealth in the State PSID
Main Independent Variables
Financial Wealth Gini The Gini coefficient of the distribution of wealth as measured by the distribution of the amount of declared dividends from household tax filings in the MSA IRS
Housing Wealth Gini The Gini coefficient of the distribution of wealth measured as home equity of houses purchased between 1999 and 2004 that do have a mortgage and of houses
that do not have a mortgage
FRED/USC
Mortgaged Housing Wealth Gini The Gini coefficient of the distribution of wealth measured as home equity of houses purchased between 1999 and 2004 that do have a mortgage USC
No Mortgage Housing Wealth Gini The Gini coefficient of the distribution of wealth measured as the home equity related to houses that do not have a mortgage FRED
Land 1880 Gini The Gini coefficient of the distribution of farm land in 1880 in the MSA USC
Proportion of Financial Wealth Owned by the Top 10 Percent A proxy of the proportion of dividends held by the top 10% dividend earners based on the average dividends earned by each income class in the IRS tax returns IRS
Proportion of Housing Wealth Owned by the Top 10 Percent The proportion of housing wealth owned by the top 10% house owners in the MSA. FRED/USC
Instrumental Variables
Homesteading in the First 10 Years of Incorporation of the MSA Area Amount of land distributed via Homestead Acts between 1862 and 1872, if the MSA was already settled at the enactment of the Act, or in the first 10 years since
first settlement, divided by the total amount of land distributed in the MSA
MSA Average Rainfall between 1895 and 2003 The average district precipitation between 1895-2003, where a district is defined as a group of clustered counties with similar climatic conditions NCDC
MSA Standard Deviation of Rainfall between 1895 and 2003 The standard deviation of district precipitation between 1895-2003, where a district is defined as a group of clustered counties with similar climatic conditions NCDC
MSA Standard Deviation of Temperature between 1895 and 2003 The standard deviation of district temperature in degrees between 1895-2003, where a district is defined as a group of clustered counties with similar climatic
conditions 
NCDC
MSA Average Temperature between 1895 and 2003 The average district temperature in degrees between 1895-2003, where a district is defined as a group of clustered counties with similar climatic conditions NCDC
MSA Soil Salinity The salt concentration of the soil solution in terms electric conductivity (ECe) in dS/m in the MSA USDA
MSA Soil Depth The distance from the top of the soil to the base of the soil horizon in cm in the MSA USDA
Control Variables
 MSA Characteristics BLM
Total MSA Estimated Financial Wealth Average dividend received by an individual in the MSA multiplied by the MSA population IRS
Total MSA Estimated  Housing Wealth The sum of the housing equity of the individuals living in the MSA FRED
MSA Real GDP per Capita The logarithm of one plus the real gross domestic product of the MSA during the year BEA
MSA House Price Index (Level) The yearly level of the House Price Index in the MSA based on the movement of single-family house prices FHFA
Urban MSA = 1 if the population density of the MSA is above the sample median, = 0 otherwise USC
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MSA House Price Index (Change) The yearly change in the House Price Index in the MSA based on the movement of single-family house prices compared to the previous year FHFA
Water Canal in the MSA in 1860 = 1 if a water canal was present in the MSA in 1860, = 0 otherwise USC
Native American Tribes in the MSA in 1860 = 1 if there was at least one Native American tribe in the MSA in 1860, = 0 otherwise USC
Railway Line in the MSA in 1860 = 1 if a railway was present in the MSA in 1860, = 0 otherwise USC
Historical Average Farm Value in the MSA Average value of farmland and buildings per acre USC
Change in MSA age composition Yearly % Change of the age composition in the MSA USC
MSA Population Growth Yearly % Change of the MSA population USC
MSA Land Size The logarithm of one plus the total MSA area in square miles at year-end 2000 USC
MSA Percentage of Inhabitants Living in Poverty % of individuals in the MSA living below the povertry line USC
Whites to total population ratio Ratio of the total MSA population of white race at divided by the MSA total population USC
Earned Income Gini The Gini coefficient of the distribution of income measured as the sum total wages and total profit and losses coming from entrepreneurial activities as reported in 
the IRS-SOI data
IRS
MSA Catholic to Protestant Ratio Ratio of the total number of Catholics divided by the total number of Evangelicals in the MSA at year-end 2000 ARDA
NOTES. The table defines the variables used in the analysis. For the sake of brevity we do not report the MSA characteristics separately. Data sources include: ARDA = Association of Religion Data Archives; BJS = Bureau for Justice Statistics; BEA = Bureau of Economic Analysis; FDIC =
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation; FFIEC = Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council; PSID = Panel Study of Income Dynamics; FHFA = Federal Housing Finance Agency; FRED = Freddie Mac; IRS = Internal Revenue Service; NCDC = National Climatic Data Center;
PSED = Panel Study of Entrepreneurial Dynamics survey; USDA = United States Department of Agriculture; USC = US Census; FBI = Federal Bureau of Investigation; Bonica 2014 = Database on Ideology, Money in Politics, and Elections; BLM = Bureau of Land Management.
E






Units Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation
1st Percentile 99th Percentile
Soil Instrumental Variables
MSA Average Rainfall between 1895 and 2003 3,982 Inch 3.16 3.30 1.11 0.72 5.25
MSA Standard Deviation of Rainfall between 1895 and 2003 3,982 - 1.92 1.83 0.68 0.66 4.10
MSA Standard Deviation of Temperature between 1895 and 2003 3,982 - 14.72 15.07 3.23 6.58 21.60
MSA Average Temperature between 1895 and 2003 3,982 °F 55.12 53.99 8.30 40.24 73.75
MSA Soil Salinity 3,177 ECe (dS/m) 0.53 0.01 1.04 0.00 4.86
MSA Soil Depth 3,186 cm 88.92 89.14 11.84 60.87 112.10
Control Variables
MSA Characteristics
Total MSA Estimated Financial Wealth 3,186 USD Million 505 41 2,751 6 8,116
Total MSA Estimated Housing Wealth 1,104 186 3,531 19 16,582
MSA Real GDP per Capita 3,883 USD 41,708 39,786 12,039 20,886 78,708
MSA House Price Index (Level) 3,927 - 175.79 167.41 34.86 124.70 300.98
MSA House Price Index (Change) 3,927 - 0.02 0.01 0.07 -0.20 0.23
Water Canal in the MSA in 1860 4,026 0/1 0.52 1 0.50 0 1
Native American Tribes in the MSA in 1860 4,026 0/1 0.49 0 0.50 0 1
Railway Line in the MSA in 1860 4,026 0/1 0.46 0 0.50 0 1
Historical Farm Values 3,982 USD 67.90 51.19 67.17 8.50 372.72
Change in MSA Age Composition 4,026 - 0.27 0.28 0.25 -0.50 0.84
Urban MSA 4,026 - 0.00 1.00 0.50 0.00 1.00
MSA Population Growth 4,026 - 0.01 0.01 0.04 -0.02 0.07
MSA Land Size 4,026 sq mi 2,495 1,637 2,934 252 14,566
MSA Percentage of Inhabitants Living in Poverty 4,022 Percentage 14.94 14.30 4.84 6.60 31.70
Whites to Total Population Ratio 4,005 Percentage 72.86 75.33 15.78 30.22 96.02
MSA Catholic to Protestant Ratio 4,026 - 0.68 0.34 0.92 0.01 4.35
TABLE A.II
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS MSA CONTROLS FOR THE EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF BUSINESS FORMATION, TYPE, FINANCING AND PUBLIC GOODS
NOTES. The table provides the number of observations, mean, standard deviation, 1st percentile, the median (50th percentile) and the 99th percentile of all MSA control variables used in the empirical analysis as
well as the instrumental variables based on MSA soil and weather characteristics. The definition of the variables can be found in Appendix Table A.I. 
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Column (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Total Taxable Dividends Taxable Dividends Taxable Interest Taxable Interest
Number of Returns Number of Returns Total Amount Reported Number of Returns Number of Returns Total Amount Reported
Total 1,882,964 306,037 1,287,291 651,013 1,189,469
Households with No Dividend Income 0 1,576,927 0.00
Under $10,000 387,555 31,604 37,351 31,604 1.18 67,710 70,567
$10,000 under $25,000 553,957 42,503 64,756 42,503 1.52 114,076 150,519
$25,000 under $50,000 454,236 60,982 104,993 60,982 1.72 152,215 184,266
$50,000 under $75,000 231,139 55,051 113,500 55,051 2.06 123,892 156,056
$75,000 under 100,000 124,646 42,277 98,721 42,277 2.34 84,098 116,665
$100,000 or more 131,431 73,620 867,970 73,620 11.79 109,022 511,396
APPENDIX TABLE A.III
EXAMPLE MSA INEQUALITY 2004 - FINANCIAL WEALTH GINI CONSTRUCTION
NOTES. The table provides an example of the data used to construct our Financial Wealth Gini measure from 2004. We obtain data from the SOI (Statement of Income) database from the IRS on the total number of tax returns in thousands (one per household)
filed in 2004 classified by zipcode and the adjusted gross income as shown in Column (1). In addition we obtain information on the number of returns that declared to have obtained a dividend and the accompanying total dividend amounts reported (reported in
thousands and thousands of US $), again classified by zipcode and the adjusted gross income of the household (shown in Columns (2) and (3) respectively). Based upon this data we calculate the average dividend amount per household reported for each income
group in Column (5). The average dividend amount is reported in thousands of US $. We create an extra category of the number of households that did not declare any dividend (which is the total reports filed minus all reports that declared a dividend) which we
report in the row 'Total', column (4) and (5) respectively. We use these average dividends as well as the income group classification to construct a Gini index, aggregating the zip code information to the corresponding MSA, in line with Rajan (2011). We create
a second Gini coefficient in the same way, only now based upon the amount of interests received by households in 2004, as reported in Columns (6) and (7). Again, we obtain this information from the SOI database. The correlations between the Gini's based
upon dividends and interest income received by households is very large and we therefore only report the results from our analysis in which we introduce the county inequality measure based upon dividends received. 
Income Group Category by Size of Adjusted 
Gross Income and Zip-Code
Average Dividend per 
Household
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Financial Wealth Gini (1) 1
Housing Wealth Gini (2) 0.476*** 1
Proportion of Financial Wealth Owned by the Top 10 Percent (3) 0.646*** 0.291*** 1
Proportion of Housing Wealth Owned by the Top 10 Percent (4) 0.488*** 0.951*** 0.266*** 1
Land Gini 1880 (5) 0.371*** 0.256*** 0.269*** 0.374*** 1
NOTES. The definition of the variables can be found in Table A.I. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
CORRELATION MATRIX - MAIN MEASURES OF INEQUALITY
TABLE A.IV
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Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dependent Variable
OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
Housing Wealth Gini -0.997*** -2.814**
(0.284) (1.208)
Mortgaged Housing Wealth Gini -1.246*** -9.573
(0.189) (8.354)
No Mortgage Housing Wealth Gini -0.791** -2.542**
(0.308) (1.102)
Land 1880 Gini -0.276** -1.105**
(0.131) (0.435)
State × Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
MSA Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
F-Statistic First Stage -- 15.424 -- 1.214 -- 15.420 -- 14.193
Number of Observations 3,740 3,707 3,740 3,707 3,707 3,685 3,399 3,399
R-Squared 0.727 0.692 0.742 -0.436 0.722 0.695 0.696 0.659
Economic Relevancy (Gini Standard Deviation) -5.0% -14.0% -15.6% -120.2% -3.8% -12.2% -3.7% -14.6%
TABLE A.V
EXPLAINING BUSINESS FORMATION: OTHER INEQUALITY MEASURES
NOTES. The dependent variable is defined as the natural logarithm of the yearly total number of new establishments in the MSA between 2004-2014 divided by total MSA population. Housing Wealth Gini is defined as
the Gini coefficient of the distribution of wealth measured as home equity of houses purchased between 1999 and 2004 that do have a mortgage and of houses that do not have a mortgage. The Mortgaged Housing
Wealth Gini is defined as the Gini coefficient of the distribution of wealth measured as home equity of houses purchased between 1999 and 2004 that do have a mortgage. The No Mortgage Housing Wealth Gini is
defined as the Gini coefficient of the distribution of wealth measured as the home equity related to houses that do not have a mortgage. The Land 1880 Gini is defined as the Gini coefficient of the distribution of farm
land in 1880 in the MSA. All other variables are defined in Appendix Table A.I. Models (1), (3), (5) and (7) are estimated with a linear regression (OLS) model. Models (2), (4), (6) and (8) are estimated with a 2SLS IV
model. MSA controls include MSA Estimated Total Financial and Housing Wealth, MSA Catholic to Protestant Ratio, MSA Land Size, MSA Real GDP, MSA House Price Index (Level), MSA House Price Index
(Change), Change in MSA Age Composition, MSA Population Growth, and a dummy variable (Urban MSA) that takes the value of 1 if the MSA population density is above the sample median. The IV estimates in
Columns (2), (4) and (6) also include Water Canal in the MSA in 1860, Native American Tribes in the MSA in 1960, Railroad Line in the MSA in 1860 and Historical Farm Value as additional controls. "Yes" indicates
that the set of fixed effects is included. "--" indicates that the indicated set of fixed effects are comprised in the wider included set of fixed effects. Estimated coefficients are reported in each first row with standard errors
below (in parentheses) that are clustered at the State level. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
ln(MSA Total Establishment Entries Per Capita)E
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Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent Variable
ln(MSA Total Establishment Exits 
Per Capita)
ln(MSA Total Establishment Exits 
Per Capita (Churning))
ln(MSA Total Establishment Exits 
Per Capita (Schumpeterian))
Financial Wealth Gini -- -2.964*** -2.841*** -2.610*** -2.719*** -2.579***
-- (0.657) (0.632) (0.668) (0.725) (0.710)
Earned Income Gini 1.081*** 0.712** 0.703** 0.387 0.585 0.333
(0.292) (0.331) (0.328) (0.343) (0.424) (0.325)
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes -- -- -- --
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes -- -- -- --
State × Year Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
MSA Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 3,729 3,729 3,696 3,696 3,024 3,024
R-Squared 0.707 0.739 0.755 0.67 0.733 0.592
Economic Relevancy (Gini Standard Deviation) -Wealth -10.6% -10.2% -9.4% -9.8% -9.3%
Economic Relevancy (Gini Standard Deviation) - Income 3.0% 3.4% 3.3% 1.8% 2.7% 1.6%
TABLE A.VI
SPECIFICATIONS EXPLAINING BUSINESS FORMATION: WEALTH AND INCOME
ln(MSA Total Establishment Entries Per Capita)
NOTES. The dependent variables are defined as: the natural logarithm of the yearly total number of new establishments in the MSA between 2004-2014 divided by total MSA population; the natural logarithm of the yearly total number of establishments that became inactive in the MSA between
2004-2014 divided by total MSA population; the natural logarithm of the yearly total number of establishments that became inactive in the MSA within 36 months of opening between 2004-2012 divided by total MSA population; and the natural logarithm of the yearly total number of establishments
that became inactive in the MSA after 36 months of opening between 2004-2012 divided by total MSA population. The Financial Wealth Gini is defined as the Gini coefficient of the distribution of wealth as measured by the distribution of the amount of declared dividends from household tax
filings in the MSA. The Earned Income Gini is defined as the Gini coefficient of the distribution of income measured as the sum total wages and total profit and losses coming from entrepreneurial activities as reported in the IRS-SOI data. All other variables are defined in Appendix Table A.I. All
Models are estimated with a linear regression (OLS) model. MSA controls include MSA Estimated Total Financial and Housing Wealth, MSA Catholic to Protestant Ratio, MSA Land Size, MSA Real GDP, MSA House Price Index (Level), MSA House Price Index (Change), Change in MSA Age
Composition, MSA Population Growth, and a dummy variable (Urban MSA) that takes the value of 1 if the MSA population density is above the sample median. "Yes" indicates that the set of fixed effects or controls is included. "--" indicates that the indicated set of fixed effects are comprised in
the wider included set of fixed effects. Estimated coefficients are reported in each first row with standard errors below (in parentheses) that are clustered at the State level. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
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Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dependent Variable
Housing Wealth Gini -3.562* -2.799* -2.833** -2.814** -2.701** -2.866** -3.018*
(1.781) (1.403) (1.209) (1.208) (1.299) (1.274) (1.473)
Railroad Line in the MSA in 1860 -0.056 -0.055 -0.052 -0.040 -0.052 -0.044
(0.040) (0.040) (0.039) (0.040) (0.039) (0.065)
Water Canal in the MSA in 1860 -0.038 -0.038 -0.040 -0.039 -0.042 -0.103***
(0.026) (0.025) (0.024) (0.026) (0.025) (0.034)
Native American Tribes in the MSA in 1860 0.019 0.018 0.019 0.013 0.019 0.022
(0.029) (0.030) (0.030) (0.034) (0.030) (0.059)
Historical Farm Values -0.086** -0.078** -0.064* -0.077** -0.073




State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes -- -- -- --
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes -- -- -- --
State × Year Fixed Effects No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
MSA Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
IV Coefficient First Stage -0.072*** -0.079*** -0.088*** -0.086*** -0.086*** -0.080*** -0.073***
F-Statistic First Stage 10.07 13.077 15.583 15.424 17.803 15.524 20.569
Number of Observations 3,773 3,773 3,740 3,707 3,267 3,707 1,936
R-Squared 0.634 0.679 0.677 0.692 0.696 0.691 0.720
Economic Relevancy (Gini Standard Deviation) -16.3% -13.0% -13.2% -13.1% -12.6% -13.3% -14.0%
TABLE A.VII
MAIN SPECIFICATIONS EXPLAINING BUSINESS FORMATION: HOUSING INEQUALITY - INSTRUMENTED
ln(MSA Total Establishment Entries Per Capita)
NOTES. The dependent variable is defined as the natural logarithm of the yearly total number of new establishments in the MSA between 2004-2014 divided by total MSA population. The Housing Wealth Gini is defined as Gini coefficient of the
distribution of wealth measured as home equity of houses purchased between 1999 and 2004 that do have a mortgage and of houses that do not have a mortgage. All other variables are defined in Appendix Table A.I. All Models are estimated with a
2SLS estimator. MSA controls include MSA Estimated Total Financial and Housing Wealth, MSA Catholic to Protestant Ratio, MSA Land Size, MSA Real GDP, MSA House Price Index (Level), MSA House Price Index (Change), Change in MSA
Age Composition, MSA Population Growth, and a dummy variable (Urban MSA) that takes the value of 1 if the MSA population density is above the sample median. "Yes" indicates that the set of fixed effects or controls is included. "No" indicates that
the set of fixed effects or controls is not included. "--" indicates that the indicated set of fixed effects or controls are comprised in the wider included set of fixed effects. Estimated coefficients are reported in each first row with standard errors below (in
parentheses) that are clustered at the State level. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. A possible concern with the Housing Wealth Gini is that it may not capture wealthy households that do not own a house but
rent instead. To control for this possibility, we obtain information on the percentage of rented housing units as a proportion of total housing units in each MSA. When we control for this variable, in unreported regressions, the sign and significance of the
wealth inequality coefficients remain unaltered. 
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Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dependent Variable
Land 1880 Gini -1.090** -1.066** -1.121** -1.105** -1.272** -1.113** -0.952*
(0.452) (0.486) (0.473) (0.490) (0.536) (0.531) (0.545)
Railroad Line in the MSA in 1860 -0.033 -0.031 -0.027 -0.025 -0.027 -0.026
(0.031) (0.031) (0.032) (0.036) (0.033) (0.063)
Water Canal in the MSA in 1860 0.024 0.025 0.020 0.029 0.020 -0.021
(0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.036) (0.032) (0.038)
Native American Tribes in the MSA in 1860 0.010 0.009 0.013 0.022 0.013 0.032
(0.026) (0.026) (0.027) (0.031) (0.027) (0.046)
Historical Farm Values -0.114* -0.095 -0.030 -0.095 -0.091




State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes -- -- -- --
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes -- -- -- --
State × Year Fixed Effects No No No No No No
MSA Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
IV Coefficient First Stage -0.261*** -0.242*** -0.245*** -0.248*** -0.244*** -0.227*** -0.216***
F-Statistic First Stage 15.06 15.24 16.30 14.19 12.58 11.49 8.88
Number of Observations 3,454 3,454 3,454 3,399 3,014 3,399 1,639
R-Squared 0.638 0.642 0.640 0.659 0.652 0.658 0.684
Economic Relevancy (Gini Standard Deviation) -13.4% -13.2% -13.8% -13.6% -15.1% -13.7% -13.0%
TABLE A.VIII
MAIN SPECIFICATIONS EXPLAINING BUSINESS FORMATION: LAND GINI 1880 - INSTRUMENTED
ln(MSA Total Establishment Entries Per Capita)
NOTES. The dependent variable is defined as the natural logarithm of the yearly total number of new establishments in the MSA between 2004-2014 divided by total MSA population. The Land 1880 Gini is defined as the Gini coefficient of the
distribution of farm land in 1880 in the MSA. All other variables are defined in Appendix Table A.I. All Models are estimated with a 2SLS estimator. MSA controls include MSA Estimated Total Financial and Housing Wealth, MSA Catholic to
Protestant Ratio, MSA Land Size, MSA Real GDP, MSA House Price Index (Level), MSA House Price Index (Change), Change in MSA Age Composition, MSA Population Growth, and a dummy variable (Urban MSA) that takes the value of 1
if the MSA population density is above the sample median. "Yes" indicates that the set of fixed effects or controls is included. "No" indicates that the set of fixed effects or controls is not included. "--" indicates that the indicated set of fixed
effects or controls are comprised in the wider included set of fixed effects. Estimated coefficients are reported in each first row with standard errors below (in parentheses) that are clustered at the State level. ***, ** and * indicate significance at
the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
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Model (1) (2) (3)
Dependent Variable
Sample / Specification
Financial Wealth Gini -13.464*
(6.980)
Housing Wealth Gini -1.204**
(0.597)
Land 1880 Gini -0.826**
(0.412)
Railroad Line in the MSA in 1860 -0.683*** -0.740*** -0.853***
(0.086) (0.068) (0.081)
Water Canal in the MSA in 1860 -0.227*** -0.353*** -0.315***
(0.084) (0.051) (0.050)
Native American Tribes in the MSA in 1860 0.233** 0.387*** 0.438***
(0.100) (0.056) (0.066)
Historical Farm Values -3.858 1.474*** 1.199**
(2.761) (0.460) (0.544)
Illiteracy -4.486*** -1.812*** -1.997***
(1.258) (0.473) (0.474)
Average Plot Size -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.003***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
State * Year Fixed Effects No No No
MSA Controls Yes Yes No
IV Coefficient First Stage -0.010*** -0.116*** -0.169***
F-Statistic First Stage 15.460 748.645 178.37
Number of Observations 165 165 165
R-Squared 0.733 0.788 0.773
Economic Relevancy (Gini Standard Deviation) -40.0% -5.8% -10.4%
TABLE A.IX
NOTES. The dependent variable is defined as the natural logarithm of the yearly total number of new establishments in the MSA between 2004-
2014 divided by total MSA population. The Financial Wealth Gini is defined as the Gini coefficient of the distribution of wealth as measured by
the distribution of the amount of declared dividends from household tax filings in the MSA. The Housing Wealth Gini is defined as Gini
coefficient of the distribution of wealth measured as home equity of houses purchased between 1999 and 2004 that do have a mortgage and of
houses that do not have a mortgage. The Land 1880 Gini is defined as the Gini coefficient of the distribution of farm land in 1880 in the MSA. All
other variables are defined in Appendix Table A.I. All Models are estimated with a 2SLS estimator. MSA controls include MSA Estimated Total
Financial and Housing Wealth, MSA Catholic to Protestant Ratio, MSA Land Size, MSA Real GDP, MSA House Price Index (Level), MSA
House Price Index (Change), Change in MSA Age Composition, MSA Population Growth, and a dummy variable (Urban MSA) that takes the
value of 1 if the MSA population density is above the sample median. "Yes" indicates that the set of fixed effects or controls is included. "No"
indicates that the set of fixed effects or controls is not included. "--" indicates that the indicated set of fixed effects or controls are comprised in the
wider included set of fixed effects. Estimated coefficients are reported in each first row with Huber-White Robust standard errors below (in
parentheses). ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
ln(MSA Total Establishment Entries Per Capita)
MAIN SPECIFICATIONS EXPLAINING BUSINESS FORMATION: INSTRUMENTED AND GEORGIA LAND LOTTERIES
Georgia Land Lotteries
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Model (1) (2) (3)
Dependent Variable
Homesteading in the First 10 Years of Incorporation of the MSA Area 0.093 -0.280 -0.255
(0.537) (0.849) (0.843)
Railroad Line in the MSA in 1860 0.211** 0.164** 0.166**
(0.086) (0.067) (0.067)
Water Canal in the MSA in 1860 0.258*** 0.086 0.085
(0.085) (0.069) (0.070)
Native American Tribes in the MSA in 1860 0.065 0.079 0.076
(0.085) (0.077) (0.076)
Illiteracy -2.767*** -1.398*** -1.424***
(0.275) (0.493) (0.492)
State Fixed Effects No Yes --
Year Fixed Effects No Yes --
State × Year Fixed Effects No No Yes
Number of Observations 4,531 4,531 4,437
R-Squared 0.19 0.73 0.80
Economic Relevancy (Gini Standard Deviation) 1.2% -3.5% -3.2%
TABLE A.X
HOMESTEADING AND FARM VALUES
ln(Farm Values)
NOTES. The dependent variable is defined as the natural logarithm of farm value. Homesteading in the First 10 Years of Incorporation of the MSA
Area is the amount of land distributed via Homestead Acts between 1862 and 1872, if the MSA was already settled at the enactment of the Act, or
in the first 10 years since first settlement, divided by the total amount of land distributed in the MSA. All other variables are defined in Appendix
Table A.I. All Models are estimated with a linear regression (OLS) model. "Yes" indicates that the set of fixed effects is included. "No" indicates
that the set of fixed effects is not included. Estimated coefficients are reported in each first row with standard errors below (in parentheses) that are
clustered at the State level. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
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Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Distance Cutoff (in kilometers) 500 500 500  1,500  1,500  1,500  3,000  3,000  3,000 
Time (in years) 1 5 10 1 5 10 1 5 10
Dependent Variable
Financial Weath Gini -3.79*** -3.79*** -3.79*** -3.79*** -3.79*** -3.79*** -3.79*** -3.79*** -3.79***
(0.848) (1.249) (1.479) (0.760) (1.192) (1.431) (0.621) (1.108) (1.362)
F-Statistic First Stage 69.59 27.58 18.62 60.53 26.04 17.90 258.92 38.85 23.15
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Moran Z-Statistic 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.51 0.51 0.51 -1.88 -1.88 -1.88
Number of Observations 3,740 3,740 3,740 3,740 3,740 3,740 3,740 3,740 3,740
R-Squared 0.947 0.947 0.947 0.947 0.947 0.947 0.947 0.947 0.947
Housing Wealth Gini -2.83*** -2.83*** -2.83*** -2.83*** -2.83*** -2.83*** -2.83*** -2.83*** -2.83***
(0.632) (0.932) (1.104) (0.567) (0.889) (1.068) (0.463) (0.827) (1.017)
F-Statistic First Stage 61.73 29.95 21.34 64.08 30.50 21.60 171.09 43.43 27.38
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Moran Z-Statistic 4.82 4.82 4.82 2.25 2.25 2.25 3.92 3.92 3.92
Number of Observations 3,740 3,740 3,740 3,740 3,740 3,740 3,740 3,740 3,740
R-Squared 0.947 0.947 0.947 0.947 0.947 0.947 0.947 0.947 0.947
Land 1880 Gini -1.12*** -1.12*** -1.12*** -1.12*** -1.12*** -1.12*** -1.12*** -1.12*** -1.12***
(0.226) (0.334) (0.395) (0.203) (0.318) (0.382) (0.166) (0.296) (0.364)
F-Statistic First Stage 103.33 38.04 25.37 119.12 39.99 26.22 294.05 49.97 30.17
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Moran Z-Statistic 1.16 1.16 1.16 -2.03 -2.03 -2.03 1.23 1.23 1.23
Number of Observations 3,454 3,454 3,454 3,454 3,454 3,454 3,454 3,454 3,454
R-Squared 0.945 0.945 0.945 0.945 0.945 0.945 0.945 0.945 0.945
TABLE A.XI
MAIN SPECIFICATIONS EXPLAINING BUSINESS FORMATION: ACCOUNTING FOR SPATIAL AND TIME CORRELATIONS
ln(MSA Total Establishment Entries Per Capita)
NOTES. The dependent variable is defined as the natural logarithm of the yearly total number of new establishments in the MSA between 2004-2014 divided by total MSA population. The Financial Wealth Gini is defined as the Gini coefficient of the
distribution of wealth as measured by the distribution of the amount of declared dividends from household tax filings in the MSA. The Housing Wealth Gini is defined as Gini coefficient of the distribution of wealth measured as home equity of houses
purchased between 1999 and 2004 that do have a mortgage and of houses that do not have a mortgage. The Land 1880 Gini is defined as the Gini coefficient of the distribution of farm land in 1880 in the MSA. All other variables are defined in Appendix
Table A.I. All Models are estimated with a 2SLS estimator and include MSA controls which include MSA Estimated Total Financial and Housing Wealth, MSA Catholic to Protestant Ratio, MSA Land Size, MSA Real GDP, MSA House Price Index (Level),
MSA House Price Index (Change), Change in MSA Age Composition, MSA Population Growth, and a dummy variable (Urban MSA) that takes the value of 1 if the MSA population density is above the sample median. "Yes" indicates that the set of fixed
effects or controls is included. Estimated coefficients are reported in each first row with standard errors below (in parentheses) that are adjusted for spatial and time-wise correlation up to the indicated cutoffs. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%
and 10% level respectively.
Accounted For Correlation Up To
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Model (1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable First Stage Regression
Financial Wealth Gini -5.904*** -5.802*** -6.054*** -5.966***
(1.098) (1.143) (1.141) (1.156)
MSA Average Rainfall between 1895 and 2003 0.011
(0.009)
MSA Standard Deviation of Rainfall between 1895 and 2003 -0.018*
(0.01)
MSA Average Temperature between 1895 and 2003 0.001
(0.001)
MSA Standard Deviation of Temperature between 1895 and 2003 0.003**
(0.001)
MSA Soil Salinity 0.006***
(0.001)
MSA Soil Depth 0.0004**
(0.0002)
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes -- -- --
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes -- -- --
State × Year Fixed Effects No No Yes No Yes
MSA Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
IV Coefficient First Stage
F-Statistic First Stage 9.871 11.076 9.871 11.076
Number of Observations 3,663 3,663 3,630 3,663 3,630
R-Squared 0.731 0.675 0.692 0.553 0.579
Economic Relevancy (Gini Standard Deviation) -45% -44% -45% -45%
TABLE A.XII
MAIN SPECIFICATIONS EXPLAINING BUSINESS FORMATION: INSTRUMENTED - SOIL AND WEATHER CHARACTERISTICS
NOTES. The dependent variables are defined as: the natural logarithm of the yearly total number of new establishments in the MSA between 2004-2014 divided by total MSA population; and the natural logarithm of the yearly total number of
establishments that became inactive in the MSA between 2004-2014 divided by total MSA population. The Financial Wealth Gini is defined as the Gini coefficient of the distribution of wealth as measured by the distribution of the amount of
declared dividends from household tax filings in the MSA. All other variables are defined in Appendix Table A.I. All Models are estimated with a 2SLS IV model. MSA controls include MSA Estimated Total Financial and Housing Wealth,
MSA Catholic to Protestant Ratio, MSA Land Size, MSA Real GDP, MSA House Price Index (Level), MSA House Price Index (Change), Change in MSA Age Composition, MSA Population Growth, and a dummy variable (Urban MSA) that
takes the value of 1 if the MSA population density is above the sample median. "Yes" indicates that the set of fixed effects is included. "No" indicates that the set of fixed effects is not included. "--" indicates that the indicated set of
characteristics or fixed effects are comprised in the wider included set of fixed effects. "Yes" indicates that the set of fixed effects or controls is included. "No" indicates that the set of fixed effects or controls is not included. "--" indicates that
the indicated set of characteristics or fixed effects are comprised in the wider included set of fixed effects. Estimated coefficients are reported in each first row with standard errors below (in parentheses) that are clustered at the State level. ***,
** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
ln(MSA Total Establishment Entries Per Capita) ln(MSA Total Establishment Exits Per Capita)
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Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent Variable
Model OLS IV OLS IV OLS OLS
Financial Wealth Gini -2.481*** -2.453 -1.752** -4.705 -2.675*** -1.582***
(0.752) (1.651) (0.757) (3.854) (0.515) (0.387)
No. of Bank Branches per Capita 0.340***
(0.051)
Total Amount of Loans to Small Business per Capita 0.110***
(0.025)
State × Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
MSA Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
F-Statistic First Stage -- 15.136 -- 11.848 -- --
Number of Observations 3,773 3,707 2,996 2,942 1,314 1,314
R-Squared 0.782 0.267 0.576 0.586 0.751 0.804
Economic Relevancy (Gini Standard Deviation) -9.4% -9.3% -6.7% -19.3% -10.2% -6.0%
NOTES. In this table we investigate the effect of wealth Inequality on credit market outcomes. The quality of the local credit/banking market is a possible channel that can explain the relationship between wealth inequality and
entrepreneurship: if financing is more prevalent in more equal areas this can foster entrepeneurship. The dependent variables are defined as: the number of yearly bank branches in the MSA divided by population between 2004-
2014; the total number of loans made to small business in the MSA between 2006-2014; the total amount of loans made to small businesses in USD in the MSA between 2006-2014: and the natural logarithm of the yearly total
number of new establishments in the MSA between 2005-2014 divided by total MSA population. The Financial Wealth Gini is defined as the Gini coefficient of the distribution of wealth as measured by the distribution of the
amount of declared dividends from household tax filings in the MSA. All other variables are defined in Appendix Table A.I. Models (2), (4) and (6) are estimated with a 2SLS estimator; all other Models are estimated using
OLS. The definition of the variables can be found in Appendix Table A.I. t-1. The definition of the variables can be found in Table A.I. MSA controls include MSA Estimated Total Wealth, MSA Catholic to Protestant Ratio,
MSA Land Size, MSA Real GDP, MSA House Price Index (Level), MSA House Price Index (Change), Change in MSA Age Composition, MSA Population Growth, and a dummy variable (Urban MSA) that takes the value of
1 if the MSA population density is above the sample median. The IV estimates in Columns (2), (4), (6) and (8) also include Railroad Line in the MSA in 1860, Water Canal in the MSA in 1860, Native American Tribes in the
MSA in 1860, and Historical Farm Value as additional controls. "Yes" indicates that the set of fixed effects is included. "--" indicates that the indicated set of characteristics or fixed effects are comprised in the wider included set
of fixed effects. Estimated coefficients are reported in each first row with standard errors below (in parentheses) that are clustered at the State level. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
Total Amount of Loans to Small Business per 
Capita
TABLE A.XIII
INEQUALITY AND FINANCING OUTCOMES AND BUSINESS FORMATION
No. of Bank Branches per Capita ln(MSA Total Establishment Entries Per Capita)
E






Financial Wealth Gini 36.046** 94.936*
(16.448) (50.044)
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes
MSA Controls Yes Yes 
F-Statistic First Stage -- 8.394
Number of Observations 424 424
R-Squared 0.518 0.496
Economic Relevancy (Gini Standard Deviation) 114.5% 301.7%
NOTES. In this table we investigate whether there is a relationship between wealth inequality and the net
worth of individuals who are about to become entrepeneurs. Also these regressions study the importance of
local credit markets in explaining the relationship between wealth inequality and entrepreneurship. In an
economy with credit constraints, an individual’s likelihood of starting a business increases with her net worth.
This implies that, for any level of wealth, more unequal areas will have lower business formation as fewer
individuals (possibly only the very rich) will have enough wealth to overcome credit market imperfections.
The dependent variable is defined as the natural logarithm of the net worth of individuals who are about to
become entrepreneurs. The Financial Wealth Gini is defined as the Gini coefficient of the distribution of
wealth as measured by the distribution of the amount of declared dividends from household tax filings in the
MSA. All other variables are defined in Appendix Table A.I. Model (1) is estimated with a linear regression
(OLS) model while Model (2) is estimated with a 2SLS IV model. MSA controls include MSA Estimated
Total Wealth, MSA Catholic to Protestant Ratio, MSA Land Size, MSA Real GDP, MSA House Price Index
(Level), MSA House Price Index (Change), Change in MSA Age Composition, MSA Population Growth, and
a dummy variable (Urban MSA) that takes the value of 1 if the MSA population density is above the sample
median. The IV estimates also include Railroad Line in the MSA in 1860, Water Canal in the MSA in 1860,
Native American Tribes in the MSA in 1860, and Historical Farm Value as additional controls. "Yes"
indicates that the set of fixed effects is included. Estimated coefficients are reported in each first row with
standard errors below (in parentheses) that are clustered at the State level. ***, ** and * indicate significance
at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
TABLE A.XIV
INEQUALITY AND NET WORTH
Ln(Entrepreneurs` Net Worth)
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2422201
Panel A: Credit Markets and Schooling
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Financial Wealth Gini -2.636*** -1.722*** -2.411*** -1.527** -2.537*** -1.681*** -1.059**
(0.470) (0.377) (0.530) (0.615) (0.459) (0.388) (0.439)
No. of Bank Branches per Capita 0.138*** 0.121*** 0.111***
(0.026) (0.024) (0.022)
Total Amount of Loans to Small Business per Capita 0.263*** 0.266*** 0.273***
(0.050) (0.054) (0.053)
Proportion of Public School Revenue Coming from Local Sources 0.386* 0.148
(0.196) (0.154)
MSA School Expenditure per Pupil -0.025 -0.022
(0.043) (0.030)
% of Individuals with at Least Some Years of College 0.004 0.005***
(0.002) (0.002)
Violent Crimes Per Capita
State × Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
MSA Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 2,969 2,969 2,040 2,040 1,986 1,986 1,986
R-Squared 0.748 0.800 0.670 0.681 0.680 0.742 0.749
Economic Relevancy (Gini Standard Deviation) -10.0% -6.5% -9.2% -5.8% -9.6% -6.4% -4.0%
Model (1) (2) (3) (4)
Financial Wealth Gini -2.483*** -1.725*** -1.119** -0.995**
(0.504) (0.430) (0.482) (0.419)
No. of Bank Branches per Capita 0.084*** 0.077*** 0.078***
(0.025) (0.024) (0.024)
Total Amount of Loans to Small Business per Capita 0.274*** 0.277*** 0.281*** 22560
(0.059) (0.058) (0.053)
Proportion of Public School Revenue Coming from Local Sources 0.108 0.066
(0.149) (0.145)
MSA School Expenditure per Pupil -0.049 -0.055
(0.066) (0.065)
% of Individuals with at Least Some Years of College 0.005*** 0.006***
(0.002) (0.002)
Violent Crimes Per Capita -0.013**
(0.006)
State × Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
MSA Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 646 646 646 646
R-Squared 0.689 0.746 0.755 0.760
Economic Relevancy (Gini Standard Deviation) -9.4% -6.6% -4.2% -3.8%
NOTES. All Models are estimated with an OLS model. The dependent variables are expressed in natural logarithms. The definition of the variables can be found in Appendix Table A.I. MSA controls
include MSA Estimated Total Financial and Housing Wealth, MSA Catholic to Protestant Ratio, MSA Land Size, MSA Real GDP, MSA House Price Index (Level), MSA House Price Index
(Change), Change in MSA Age Composition, and a dummy variable (Urban MSA) that takes the value of 1 if the MSA population density is above the sample median. "Yes" indicates that the set of
fixed effects is included. "--" indicates that the indicated set of characteristics or fixed effects are comprised in the wider included set of fixed effects. t-1 indicates a one year lag. Estimated coefficients
are reported in each first row with standard errors below (in parentheses) that are clustered at the state level. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
TABLE A.XV
HORSERACE OF INEQUALITY WITH CREDIT MARKETS AND LOCAL PUBLIC GOODS
MSA Total Establishment Entries Per Capita
Panel B: Credit Markets, Schooling and Violent Crimes
MSA Total Establishment Entries Per Capita
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Stege 3
No. of Bank Branches per Capita 1.149** 1.149** 0.629***
(0.580) (0.584) (0.110)
Total Amount of Loans to Small Business per Capita 0.834 0.861 0.421***
(0.604) (0.621) (0.084)
Proportion of Public School Revenue Coming from Local Sources 2.066* 2.066* 0.727**
(1.234) (1.235) (0.324)
School Expenditure per Pupil 0.045* 0.045* 0.006
(0.024) (0.024) (0.108)
Violent Crime per Capita -0.077** -0.075** -0.062***
(0.036) (0.037) (0.011)
Stage 2
No. of Bank 
Branches per 
Capita
Total Amount of 











Violent Crime per 
Capita
No. of Bank 
Branches per 
Capita
Total Amount of 











Violent Crime per 
Capita
No. of Bank 
Branches per 
Capita
Total Amount of 











Violent Crime per 
Capita
Gini (Used in Stage 1) -3.771** -5.325 -2.089** -1.046 49.726*** -3.102* -4.477 -1.722** -0.264 40.396** -1.242*** -1.982** -0.448** -0.665 11.622***
(1.629) (4.507) (0.853) (1.947) (19.162) (1.672) (4.001) (0.762) (1.817) (19.112) (0.417) (0.907) (0.226) (0.506) (2.883)
Stage 1
Proportion of Land Assigned via Homestead Act -0.059*** -0.059*** -0.059*** -0.052*** -0.059*** -0.072*** -0.072*** -0.072*** -0.062** -0.072*** -0.262*** -0.260*** -0.253*** -0.251*** -0.261***
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.017) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.025) (0.023) (0.057) (0.056) (0.054) (0.054) (0.057)
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
MSA Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 3,773 2,996 3,707 3,707 2,329 3,773 2,996 3,707 3,707 2,329 3,773 2,996 3,707 3,707 2,329
3SLS
TABLE A.XVI
NOTES. All variables are defined in Appendix Table A.I. MSA controls include MSA Estimated Total Financial and Housing Wealth, MSA Catholic to Protestant Ratio, MSA Land Size, MSA Real GDP, MSA House Price Index (Level), MSA House Price Index (Change), Change in MSA Age Composition, MSA Population Growth, and a
dummy variable (Urban MSA) that takes the value of 1 if the MSA population density is above the sample median, Railroad Line in the MSA in 1860, Water Canal in the MSA in 1860, Native American Tribes in the MSA in 1860, and Historical Farm Value. "Yes" indicates that the set of fixed effects is included. Estimated coefficients are
reported in each first row with standard errors below (in parentheses) that are clustered at the state level. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
ln(MSA Total Establishment Entries Per Capita)
Financial Wealth Gini Housing Wealth Gini Land Gini 1880
E
lectronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com
/abstract=
2422201
  : 
1
c/o University of Geneva, Bd. Du Pont d'Arve 42, CH-1211 Geneva 4
T +41 22 379 84 71, rps@sfi.ch, www.sfi.ch
Swiss Finance Institute
Swiss Finance Institute (SFI) is the national center for fundamental  
research, doctoral training, knowledge exchange, and continuing 
education in the fields of banking and finance. SFI’s mission is to  
grow knowledge capital for the Swiss financial marketplace. Created  
in 2006 as a public–private partnership, SFI is a common initiative  
of the Swiss finance industry, leading Swiss universities, and the  
Swiss Confederation.
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2422201
